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This research implements the first Houston/Galveston area hurricane risk 
assessment of bridges for multiple failure modes: bridge deck uplift and bridge 
scour. Due to recent hurricane damage of bridges, emergency managers need to 
understand the potential state of the bridge network immediately following a storm 
for effective mitigation and post-event planning. To that end, this study builds a new 
database of bridge information necessary for vulnerability modeling, adapts current 
deterministic models of bridge deck uplift and scour for a probabilistic framework 
and expands the scour models to include a qualitative estimate for embankment 
scour. The study area bridges are tested under various hurricane scenario events to 
reveal the likelihood of damage. Potential applications include retrofit prioritization, 
real-time spatial damage modeling and better informed preparation. By 
understanding the risk hurricanes pose to the bridge system, emergency officials 
can better plan rescue and recovery efforts before a storm impacts the Texas coast 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In coastal regions, hurricanes can inflict substantial damage to structures, 
infrastructure and communities, with significant direct and indirect consequences. 
Among the affected infrastructure, hurricanes greatly impact coastal transportation 
systems by destroying bridges and sections of roadway, and hindering rescue and 
recovery efforts after the event. To that end, this research focuses on determining 
the risk that hurricanes pose to the Houston/Galveston bay area transportation 
infrastructure by conducting a thorough inventory analysis to support vulnerability 
modeling, developing or adapting new models of bridge reliability and applying 
them to a regional suite of bridges for various scenario hurricane events. These 
models of bridge reliability are the first probabilistic models of their type to be 
adapted for use across large geographical regions, such as the Houston/Galveston 
bay area. The risk assessment framework proposed considers multiple failure 
modes of the bridges in the chosen area; namely, bridge deck uplift, the movement 
1 
of the bridge deck from its supports, and scour, the erosion of soil beneath roadways 
and bridge supports, in order to give a more complete idea of the state of the bridge 
and roadway network after a hurricane. 
1.1. Motivation and Scope of Research 
2 
Understanding the vulnerability of bridge and roadway infrastructure to hurricane 
events is critical to support pre-event planning for risk mitigation, as well as post-
event action. During this post-event activity phase, the transportation infrastructure 
system is essential as a means to transport emergency care and relief equipment 
into coastal communities, such as Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula, access 
victims and critical facilities, and eventually support long term recovery and 
rebuilding. Thus, the roadway system must be resilient enough to withstand the 
hurricane event or officials must know about potential issues in the infrastructure 
system and be able to plan accordingly. Furthermore, heightened understanding of 
the risk of damage can enable effective targeting of resources, such as retrofit or 
upgrade, in advance of an event to mitigate adverse consequences. 
Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, revealed that the coastal bridge and roadway 
network is vulnerable to hurricane induced surge and wave forces, as 45 bridges 
failed during the event, several of which required extensive repair or rebuilding 
(DesRoches, 2006). This sparked recent research into the causes of bridge failures 
during hurricanes and how the bridge deck interacts with the surge and wave 
produced by the storm. The current research in bridge performance during 
hurricanes has been instrumental in determining the forces that a single bridge will 
face during a hurricane event, but, with few exceptions, these studies do not address 
any failure modes of the bridge other than deck movement nor do they present a 
framework to evaluate the risk of damage across a large region (like that affected by 
Hurricane Ike). Reconnaissance teams sent in after Hurricane Katrina found that 
while many of the bridges in Katrina failed due to bridge deck movement or 
electrical failures in movable bridges, a significant percentage of bridges also failed 
due to abutment scour and approach span undermining (DesRoches, 2006). 
3 
In order to help facilitate risk mitigation and planning efforts, quantification 
of the risk of damage to bridge and roadway infrastructure is needed across a 
regional area. These risks may be associated with unseating of bridge decks, scour of 
bridges, undermining of soils supporting the roadways, and even debris. This thesis 
provides a framework for probabilistic assessment of bridge and approach 
roadways for multiple failure modes viable for risk assessment across a regional 
portfolio of bridge and roadway infrastructure susceptible to coastal storms. 
Integral to this framework, this study conducts a rigorous review of bridge details to 
characterize the inventory in the Houston/Galveston area, and provides an 
archetype database of bridge information necessary for vulnerability modeling of 
any regional portfolio. A recently proposed probabilistic approach for assessment of 
bridge deck unseating is adapted for application to the case study region, while a 
new approach for fragility assessment of scour potentiql is proposed that integrates 
a probabilistic framework with current deterministic methodologies to account for 
uncertainty in the soil parameters, hydraulic parameters, and bridge geometry. 
Additionally, the inherent bias from the original models is removed in order to 
accurately assess the risk that the hurricane forces pose to the bridge network while 
accounting for model error. Finally, in recognition of the role that roadway and 
bridge approach damage play in posing a risk to post-event performance of the 
transportation network, qualitative estimates of embankment scour are provided. 
4 
The proposed multi-failure mode framework for bridge deck uplift and scour 
vulnerability is then applied to a regional assessment of the Houston/Galveston bay 
area for several scenario hurricane events, examining the spatial distribution of 
damage, accessibility of post-event re-entry routes, and critical facility access in the 
Galveston, Bolivar and Clear Lake regions. The risk assessment framework 
developed in this study is formulated as a database driven model with algorithms 
that can be utilized for any region. Although three case study scenarios are 
examined in this thesis, the Houston/Galveston bay area inventory analysis and 
fragility models derived can be readily incorporated with advanced hurricane 
modeling software for emergency officials to have a more holistic view of the 
hurricane and its effects on the transportation infrastructure applied to future 
probabilistic or deterministic storms. 
1.2. Overview of Thesis 
This thesis is broken up into eight chapters. Chapter 2 reviews reconnaissance 
reports from Hurricanes Katrina and Ike, as well as the current literature on 
estimation of storm surge and wave forces, scour depth at bridge piers and 
abutments and the current risk assessment models used in hurricane emergency 
planning. Chapter 3 conducts an in-depth inventory analysis for bridge 
infrastructure in the Houston/Galveston bay area including all of the sources of data 
used in the models. Chapter 4 describes the bridge deck uplift fragility approach 
that is used in this study and how it is adapted for use on the regional level. Chapter 
5 details the framework proposed for probabilistic analysis of scour, and examines 
the scour analysis approach for piers, abutment and embankments as well as the 
sources of uncertainty in these models. Chapter 6 presents the results of applying 
the bridge deck and scour fragility models in a risk assessment of the 
Houston/Galveston bay area for three scenario hurricane events, and evaluates the 
state of transportation infrastructure for hind cast and hypothetical storms. Chapter 
7 delves into the practical applications of this research, especially in emergency 
planning and analysis of post-event entry routes onto Galveston Island among other 
areas and applications. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of this study 




2.1. Empirical Evidence of Common Failure Modes from 
Previous Hurricane Events 
Many hurricanes in the past several decades have caused damage to the bridge 
infrastructure systems, such as Hurricane Camille in 1969, Hurricane Ivan in 2004 
(Douglass et al., 2004), the Songda Typhoon in 2004 and Hurricane Irene in 
2011(AP, 2011), just to name a few. However, two hurricanes in particular, 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ike, have focused national and local attention, 
respectively, on understanding and improving bridge and roadway performance 
during coastal storm events. 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005 on the southern coast of 
Louisiana with winds over 140 MPH and surge that reached up to 35 feet 
(DesRoches, 2006). Hurricane Katrina is the most expensive tropical cyclone on 
6 
record in the US (not adjusted for inflation) (Blake et al., 2011). While the flooding 
of New Orleans and loss of life that accompanied the failure of the levee system 
protecting the city of New Orleans has received the most national attention, also 
important was the performance of the bridge and roadway networks during 
Hurricane Katrina and the damages evident (DesRoches, 2006). 
During Hurricane Katrina, 45 bridges were damaged, including one bridge 
that was under construction at the time. Of these bridges, most were movable spans 
that had their electrical and mechanical equipment submerged with storm surge, 
but these bridges accounted for a small portion of the emergency repair costs and, 
indeed, were seen to have slight damage. Table 2.1 shows the causes of damage and 
emergency rebuilding costs associated with bridges during Katrina with some 
bridges having multiple failure modes (DesRoches, 2006, Padgett et al., 2008). When 
bridges had multiple failure modes the cost of emergency repairs was assigned to 
both causes' costs; therefore, the table below cannot be taken as total cost of the 
hurricane but rather as relative costs of different failure modes. Figure 2.1 below 
show the various failure modes seen in Hurricane Katrina. Also, Table 2.2 shows the 
number of bridges at each level of severity of damage for each cause; see Appendix 




Figure 2.1: Failure Modes Evidenced in Hurricane Katrina (Padgett et al., 2008) (a.) 
Bridge Deck Uplift/Unseating; (b.) Impact; (c.) Scour under Approaches; and (d.) 
Inundation of Electrical/Mechanical Equipment. 
Failure Mode Number of Bridges Cost of Emergency Repairs 
Unseating/ Shifting of Spans 10 $584.9 million 
Scour 13 $52.14 million 
Impact 6 $11.51 million 
Inundation of Electrical or 27 $14.87 million 
Mechanical Equipment 
Table 2.1: Number of Bridges and Costs of Failure Modes in Hurricane Katrina-
Adapted from Padgett et al. (2008). 
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Failure Mode Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Unseating/ Shifting of Spans 0 2 3 5 
Scour 0 2 10 1 
Impact 0 4 2 0 
Inundation of Electrical or 8 13 6 0 
Mechanical Equipment 
Table 2.2: Severity of Bridge Damage from Failure Modes in Hurricane Katrina-
Adapted from Padgett et al. (2008). 
As is evidenced in these tables, while inundation claimed the highest number 
of bridges, the inundation did not usually lead to complete damage of the bridge in 
question and, despite the increased number of bridges, did not account for the 
majority of emergency repair costs (Padgett et al., 2008). One reason why more 
bridges failed from inundation than from other failure modes in Hurricane Katrina 
is the vast numbers of movable bridges in Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi (NBI, 
2010). The same is not true of all coastal bridge networks, and is not the case in the 
Houston/Galveston area. The two failure modes that had the highest relative 
emergency costs and, following inundation, had the highest number of bridges 
damaged were unseating/shifting of bridge spans and scour at bridges and 
approaches. 
From the 10 bridges that failed predominantly from their spans shifting, 
roughly 1000 spans were displaced or taken completely off their supports by surge 
and wave forces (Padgett et al., 2009). Some of the common features of the bridges 
that failed due to deck unseating were low clearance above the mean water level, 
simply-supported bridge decks, lack of vertical reinforcement between sub and 
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super-structure and lack of horizontal resistance such as shear keys (Padgett et al., 
2009, DesRoches, 2006, Okeil and Cai, 2008, Robertson et al., 2007). The second 
costliest mode of failure, scour, was not examined in too much detail after Hurricane 
Katrina, but it is an important failure mode of the bridges since excessive scour at 
the bridge or roadway can cause a disconnect in the transportation network. 
Additionally, while not tabulated here, the cause of almost all the roadway 
damage seen in Hurricane Katrina was due to soil undermining of the roadways 
which led to the collapse of roadway sections and debris accumulated on roadways 
(DesRoches, 2006). The erosion of soil beneath roadways is closely related to 
embankment scour that occurs at bridges and will be looked at in more detail in the 
scour Section 5.4 of this thesis. Debris removal from roadways is a key component 
of post-event recovery, as debris hinders rescue efforts to enter communities; 
however, debris modeling is outside of the scope of this thesis and can be explored 
in future work. Hence, while the greatest cost of rebuilding the transportation 
system after Hurricane Katrina was associated with bridges, the damage done to the 
roadways was also extensive and caused disruption to recovery efforts (DesRoches, 
2006). Even though Hurricane Katrina prompted the most research into 
understanding the forces that hurricanes exert on bridge structures, it was during 
Hurricane Ike that the direct risks to the Houston/Galveston area transportation 
system were realized. 
Hurricane Ike landed on shores of the Texas coastline on September 13, 2008 
as a strong Category 2 storm with wind speeds of 110 MPH and surge levels 
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reaching 20 feet (Stearns and Padgett, 2011, FEMA, 2008). While hitting Galveston 
and Houston hard, leaving millions flooded and without power, Hurricane Ike did 
the most damage to the Bolivar Peninsula where almost every house was leveled by 
the surge and wave forces (FEMA, 2008). Although at a different scale than 
Hurricane Katrina before it, Hurricane Ike impacted the transportation 
infrastructure in the Houston/Galveston bay area (Stearns and Padgett, 2011). In 
total, 53 bridges were damaged during Hurricane Ike, mostly small, local, timber 
structures but also three larger concrete and steel bridges (Stearns and Padgett, 
2011). Although a direct comparison to the damages seen in Hurricane Katrina is 
not warranted because the bridges documented in Katrina were all large state-
owned bridge structures compared to mostly locally or privately owned timber 
structures, it is still important and valuable to observe the failure modes of the 
bridges in Hurricane Ike since this research project focuses on the most likely risks 
to the major transportation routes in the Houston/Galveston bay area. 
During Hurricane Ike, almost all the bridges that failed did so due to deck 
unseating or scour related problems, with very few bridges failing due to impact or 
submergence of electrical equipment. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of damaged 
bridges along with the causes for damage (Stearns and Padgett, 2011). The highest 
number of bridges failed due to deck unseating and also caused the most extreme 
damage, as was also seen in Hurricane Katrina. However, scour was more 
thoroughly evidenced and was a close second in the number of bridges damaged 
although the level of damage was less. Through these two hurricanes, and Hurricane 
Ike in particular, it is seen that bridge deck unseating and scour related damages are 
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the two most prevalent and costly failure modes of bridge structures during coastal 
storm events and thus it is those two failure modes that this research addresses 
jointly to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment of the Houston/Galveston 
bay area. 
Impact 1 2 3 0 6 
Inundation of 0 1 0 0 1 
Electrical E ment 
Table 2.3: Number and Severity of Bridges Damaged from Failure Modes during 
Hurricane Ike- Adapted from Stearns and Padgett (2011). 
2.2. Bridge Deck Uplift Failure Mode: Mechanics and Research 
The movement of bridge spans from their supports has consistently been the 
costliest and, in some cases, the most frequent damage seen in hurricanes events in 
the coastal United States. Due to this fact, understanding the forces that act on the 
bridge deck during hurricanes is of utmost importance to being able to estimate 
failure probabilities for a region. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, most work on wave and 
storm surge forces was limited to quantifying forces on offshore platforms since 
they often experience higher surge and wave values being in the Gulf of Mexico and 
because they are vital to the oil and gas industries (Bea et al., 1999, Bea et al., 2001, 
Sarpkaya and Isaacson, 1981). After Hurricane Katrina exposed the vulnerability of 
the coastal bridge system, a great deal of research was conducted to understand the 
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forces that storm surge and waves exert on the decks of these coastal bridges since 
the models of forces used for offshore platforms were inadequate to fully 
understand the interaction of the waves with the bridge decks (Douglass et al., 2006, 
Aguffiiga et al., 2008, Cuomo et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2009, Marin and Sheppard, 
2009, Bradner et al., 2011). Following these and other experiments, the combined 
forces of storm surge and waves acting on a bridge deck have been characterized 
into four distinct components: drag, inertia, buoyancy and slamming forces, with all 
the forces except buoyancy acting in both the horizontal and vertical directions. 
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2.2.1. Surge and Wave Forces Acting on Bridge Decks 
Drag forces occur as a result of the flow velocity around the bridge deck and are 
related to the area of the bridge deck in contact with fluid flow based on angle and 
direction. The inertial forces experienced by the bridge deck are "proportional to 
the time rate of change of linear momentum of the water mass impacting the 
structure" (Marin and Sheppard, 2009). This is generally the mass of the water 
displaced by the structure along with what is referred to as the added mass: a 
portion of the water surrounding the bridge deck that changes with time to reflect 
the dynamic interaction of the fluid with the bridge deck. As noted in most physics 
based models, and by Marin and Sheppard (2009), the inertial force on a fully 
submerged structure is usually constant, but for partially submerged structures, this 
force varies in time as both the mass of the water displaced and the added mass 
changes. The force acting on the structure that is the easiest to calculate and 
understand is the buoyancy force: the weight of the water displaced by the bridge 
deck acting in the vertical direction. The drag, inertial and buoyancy forces are 
called quasi-static forces because they have frequencies that are on the same order 
as that of the waves. The last component of force acting on the structures is the 
slamming force which is primarily due to trapped air between the wave and the 
bottom of the bridge deck. The combination of the vertical forces reducing the 
effective weight of a given bridge deck and the horizontal forces pushing the deck 
off its supports can often lead to the displacement or removal of many simply 
supported bridge spans as seen extensively during Hurricane Katrina (Okeil and Cai, 
2008, DesRoches, 2006). 
2.2.2. Research on Surge and Wave Forces Prior to Hurricane Katrina 
As mentioned earlier, before 2005, most scholarly interest in wave forces was 
related to the fields of protecting offshore structures and jetties from hurricane 
forces (Sarpkaya and Isaacson, 1981, Kaplan et al., 1995, Bea et al., 1999, French, 
1979). For these offshore platforms, horizontal forces were the most important, 
especially slamming forces as these can move equipment and destroy the platform 
decks. Vertical wave forces, however, were considered to be of less importance 
because most platforms decks have grated floors that reduce the vertical loads on 
the structure to values on par with the horizontal loads and because, for the most 
part, horizontal platforms are well anchored to their substructures (Bea et al., 
1999). The results of the work on offshore platforms include many varying 
methodologies for calculating forces on horizontal platforms based on empirical 
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data and physics based models, but they are not immediately applicable to the case 
of coastal bridges. 
Even though research on offshore platforms constituted most of the work 
done on wave force prior to 2005, wave forces on docks and bridge-like structures 
were being investigated as early as 1963 when El Ghamry (1963) modeled the effect 
of wave forces on docks, and found that the uplift forces generated by waves on 
docks were very sensitive to wave height and wave length (El Ghamry, 1963). 
Additionally, Denson conducted small-scale laboratory tests on bridge decks in both 
1978 and 1980, the first research to directly look at bridge decks (Denson, 1978, 
Denson, 1980). While his work found some interesting conclusions that would be 
repeated after Hurricane Katrina (i.e. that wave moments caused most of the 
damage from Hurricane Camille and that anchorage could have prevented said 
damage), there are limitations of his work, including the fact that the results from 
the wave basin tests of his two experiments varied greatly. While this early work on 
both offshore platforms and, to a limited extent, bridge decks is valuable to an 
analysis of the demand caused by wave forces, many of the methodologies 
developed cannot be directly applied to coastal bridge decks because of limited 
experimental testing in the case of the few projects utilizing bridge deck geometry 
and because of differences in geometry and coastal bathymetry in the case of work 
on offshore platforms. 
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2.2.3. Research on Surge and Wave Forces since Hurricane Katrina 
With Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the subject of wave force research was focused on 
bridge structures due to multitude of bridges damaged during the storm. In addition 
to reconnaissance to understand why the bridges failed (DesRoches, 2006), 
Hurricane Katrina also prompted researchers to investigate and review existing 
work done on wave forces, which was completed by groups at the University of 
South Alabama (Douglass et al., 2006) and at Texas A&M University Kingsville 
(Aguffiiga et al., 2008). These reports called for more experimental testing of bridge 
decks, both small and large-scale, as well as experimental tests that varied wave 
periods, wave length and wave height (Douglass et al., 2006, Aguffiiga et al., 2008). 
Since then, research has been conducted to quantify the wave forces on large-scale 
bridge structures, using a 1:5 scale through Bradner's work (Bradner et al., 2011), 
as well as 1:10 scale experiments to understand the slamming force of trapped air 
under bridge superstructures (Cuomo et al., 2009). Additionally Marin and 
Sheppard adapted Kaplan's physics-based method for offshore structures to analyze 
bridge deck geometries (Marin and Sheppard, 2009). As a result of these endeavors 
to better characterize wave loads on bridge decks, the American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) developed the first specifications 
for design of bridges subjected to coastal storms in 2008 (AASHTO, 2008). The 
AASHTO specifications give guidance to designers by consolidating the wave force 
research into a methodology to calculate the maximum vertical and horizontal 
forces exerted by a given wave or storm surge, based primarily on the work of Marin 
and Sheppard (2009). The work presented in the AASHTO specifications is the basis 
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of the bridge deck uplift model presented in this thesis and will be explored in 
greater depth later. 
2.3. Scour Failure Mode 
As seen in both Hurricanes Katrina and Ike, scour is consistently the second most 
frequent and costliest failure mode and thus the mechanics of it must be understood 
in order to assess the risk scour poses to the bridge and roadway network. 
2.3.1. Mechanics of Scour 
Scour is the erosion of soil from under or around bridge supports, mainly piers, 
abutments or embankments. Hurricanes notwithstanding, scour is a critical issue in 
the US and accounts for more general bridge failures than any other cause (Briaud, 
2006). In hurricane events, however, scour can have highly detrimental effects on 
the bridge and roadway system, mainly through embankment scour where the soil 
directly behind the abutment can erode causing the approach spans or roadway to 
collapse. 
To understand bridge scour, an understanding of the mechanics of soil 
erosion must first be obtained. When water starts to flow over and around soil 
particles, three things happen: 1.) at the interface between water and soil particles, 
shear and drag forces develop, 2.) because of the flow of water around the soil 
particle, the normal force exerted on the soil particle decreases, and 3.) both the 
normal and shear stresses at the boundaries fluctuate with time (Briaud and Oh, 
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2010). With these three conditions occurring, the shear forces can overcome the 
forces holding the soil particles together and erosion can occur. Hence, there is a 
threshold force that must be exceeded (usually given as a specific water velocity, 
used in this study, or shear stress) in order for erosion to initiate. With an 
understanding of how scour is initiated, bridge scour in a more general sense can be 
discussed. Bridge scour is usually broken up into general scour, contraction scour 
and local scour. General scour can occur with or without the presence of a bridge 
and is erosion along the water bed. One example of this occurs when improvements 
to a channel cause increased water velocity and thus erosion of the soil on the 
bottom and banks of the channel. Contraction scour occurs when a channel or 
waterway is constricted by embankments from a bridge causing water velocity to 
increase and erosion to occur (Briaud and Oh, 2010). This thesis is not concerned 
with these types of scour as they occur over the life-cycle of the bridge or even 
without a bridge, so the presence of a hurricane does little to increase the 
probability of these scour types. The last scour type, local scour, includes the three 
types of erosion studied in this project: pier, abutment and embankment scour. 
Local scour is defined as erosion around a localized point, such as the bridge pier or 
abutment and is caused by the increased turbulence of the water around the 
impeding objects. Additionally, embankment scour occurs when the soil sloping 
from the body of water to the abutment or underneath approach spans erodes. 
Below is a simple schematic that shows general, contraction and local scour in 
relation to a bridge structure. 
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River Bed before Scour 
River Bed after Scour 
Zc = Contraction Scour 
Zp = Pier Scour 
Za =Abutment Scour 
Figure 2.2: Schematic of Scour at Bridges (Briaud, 2006). 
2.3.2. Current Scour Practices and Hydraulic Engineering Circulation-18 
After the Shoharie Creek Bridge failure in 1987, the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) required that every bridge over a tlscourable stream~~ be 
inspected for vulnerability to scour (Harrison and Morris, 1991). To help with this 
inspection, the FHWA produced a technical advisory and two technical publications 
providing guidance to city and state officials developing a scour inspection and 
evaluation program. Of these publications, it is Hydraulic Engineering Circulation-
18 (HEC-18)- tiEvaluating Scour at Bridges~~ that is of the most use in this study as it 
lays out a plan, for both new and existing bridges, to estimate the maximum scour 
depth a bridge will see in its lifetime (Richardson and Davis, 2001) . However, while 
this publication is highly useful to design engineers and inspectors alike, the 
equations presented there are deterministic in nature and give no indication as to 
what the most likely depth of scour will be for a bridge, given a certain lifespan. 
19 
20 
Also, the method presented in HEC-18 is based on tests done in sand-flumes and 
thus will be highly conservative for bridges whose piers are located in cohesive soils 
which are known to have a much slower erosion rate (Briaud et al., 2001b). Finally, 
while still widely used as a scour depth indicator, the original HEC-18 method, 
called HEC-18 (sand), does not include any time-dependency or allow for a 
hydrograph of the channel at a given bridge to be used as an input; instead an 
average water velocity is chosen as representative for the life of the bridge and the 
maximum scour depth that the pier could ever experience is calculated. For the 
purposes of this study, scour depth has to be estimated from a short-term, high 
velocity event to verify if hurricanes can significantly affect the scour depth at 
bridge piers or abutments, leading to repair or failure. This requires a slightly 
different approach, which is laid out in Briaud et al. (2004), called the SRICOS 
method or HEC- 18 (clay), as it is now incorporated as one of the options presented 
in HEC-18. 
2.3.3. SRICOS/HEC-18 (clay) Method 
The SRICOS method was developed to better understand the scour at bridges with 
cohesive soil types; thereby addressing a missing element in the previous HEC-18 
(sand) method which was based solely on sand flume tests. This method used flume 
tests of bridges in silts and clays, the soil types considered cohesive. Silts and clays 
are defined as those soil samples that have more than SO% of a soil sample pass 
through a 0.075 mm sieve, with silts ranging from 0.075 mm to 0.002 mm and clays 
being less than 0.002 mm in size (Briaud et al., 2004). These two soil types were 
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chosen because they are known to erode much more slowly than sands and thus, 
while a bridge located in sand may reach maximum scour depth with just one flood 
event, a bridge in a cohesive soil could never reach its potential maximum scour 
depth estimated by the HEC-18 (sand) method (Briaud et al., 2004). However, with 
the new HEC-18 (clay) method, in order to properly estimate the scour depth, the 
erosion rate of the soil must first be determined so as to calculate how quickly a 
bridge will approach its maximum scour depth over time. This was accomplished 
through the creation of the Erosion Function Apparatus (EFA), which is a 
mechanical apparatus that pushes a given soil sample through a Shelby tube (like a 
push-up ice cream pop) into flowing water and measures how long it takes for 1 mm 
of the soil to erode. This test is done with varying water velocities until a full range 
of erosion rates (in mm/hr) can be determined for a range of water velocity (Briaud 
et al., 2001b). This EFA output and the maximum scour depth are the basic inputs to 
the SRICOS method. 
SRICOS assumes that the time dependent scour depth at the bridge is 
hyperbolic, based on the initial scour rate (determined from the EFA graph of 
erosion rate vs. water velocity or shear stress) and the maximum scour depth. Based 
on the initial erosion rate of the soil in question, the scour depth would increase 
hyperbolically over time until the maximum scour depth is reached. The SRICOS 
method, because of its ability to determine the time-dependent scour depth at a 
bridge site, is used as the basis of the probabilistic pier and abutment scour models 
presented in Chapter 5. However, specific literature about each of the scour types is 
presented below. 
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2.3.4. Pier Scour Research 
Pier scour, which is the most common in non-flood events and is the best 
understood of the scour phenomena, occurs when flowing water erodes the soil 
around a pier causing a hole to form around the pier which exposes the pile, 
elongates the effective length of the pier and reduces the capacity of the pier to 
resist lateral forces (Chiew, 2008). There are a plethora of equations, outside of the 
two methods presented above, to determine the scour depth at piers, but many of 
these equations are used for design purposes to estimate the maximum scour depth 
a pier would experience rather than the scour depth due to a certain event or during 
a certain duration. The equations also, in many cases, include a factor of safety 
which is desirable for design but which hampers estimations of potential scour 
depth for existing bridges (Johnson, 1995). For example, the most commonly used 
scour equation at piers, HEC-18 (sand), was originally created for bridges in the 
design phase and contains a built in safety factor. 
The SRICOS method discussed above has already been simplified by in the 
work of Briaud et al. (2010) and Govindasamy et al. (2008) to be applied with 
limited data source, and allows, with some caveats, for the initial erosion rate of the 
soil to be estimated based upon soil type, eliminating the need for site specific soil 
samples (Govindasamy et al., 2008). Additionally, Bolduc et al. (2008) took the 
SRICOS method and, using Bayesian models, developed a logistic, probabilistic 
model that accounted for the bias in the original equation (Bolduc et al., 2008). Such 
bias removal and error estimation are key for application of the predictive 
equations in reliability assessment. However, even with the improvements of Briaud 
et al. (2010), Govindasamy et al. (2008) and Bolduc et al. (2008), the SRI COS method 
has not been applied to a large suite of bridges in a probabilistic way as to ascertain 
the likelihood of meeting or exceeding a particular scour depth. 
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In addition to various models that calculate scour for a given bridge site, 
there are also many models that give a relative scour ranking based on items in the 
National Bridge Inventory (NBI) database (Morris and Pagan-Ortiz, 1997, Harrison 
and Morris, 1991, Stein et al., 1999). These models usually indicate scour 
vulnerability in bridges based on rankings of the condition of bridge super and 
substructure, channel adequacy, cost of rebuilding, and average daily traffic. While 
these simplified models include the costs of each bridge when ranking scour 
vulnerability and can easily be applied to a regional set of bridges, they only rank 
risk based on biannual reports made to the Nation Bridge Inventory and take into 
account normal water flows around the bridges, not the increased velocity of 
hurricane storm surge. Also, these models are intended to be used as an indicator of 
a bridge's lifetime susceptibility to scour, not the susceptibility to a specific event. 
Thus, while a valuable tool to determine scour critical bridges, they do not 
accurately embody the risk that hurricane storm surge poses in causing additional 
scour at bridge piers and are used in this study for identification purposes only (i.e. 
identifying which bridges are scour critical before a hurricane event and if increased 
water levels and velocities cause additional scour at these bridges as opposed to 
those bridges with generally low scour vulnerability). 
Even though pier scour has received the most research attention, in 
Hurricanes Katrina and Ike it was not seen as a large failure mode of the bridges and 
there is evidence that the surge during a hurricane does not increase scour depth at 
piers enough to cause major issues in most cases (Froehlich and Fisher, 2000). In 
fact, it was discovered that while the hurricanes bring in high water velocity to the 
piers, the short duration of the storm actually causes scour from hurricanes to play 
less of a role in pier scour than normal tidal flows do (Froehlich and Fisher, 2000). 
Thus, while pier scour will be estimated in this study, it will likely only play a role in 
the failure of those bridges which are already known to be scour critical and 
discovering a method to measure scour at abutments and embankments is of 
primary importance. 
2.3.5. Abutment Scour Research 
Abutment scour is much more complex than pier scour and less research has been 
conducted on how to measure scour at abutments. There are theories that abutment 
scour can be estimated in a similar manner to pier scour with slightly different 
assumptions (Melville, 1997), but there are also theories that postulate that no 
comparison can be drawn between pier and abutment scour because of the eddies 
that can form due to abutment type and shape since the water cannot flow freely 
around the abutment as it can around piers (Chiew, 2008). With that in mind, it is 
difficult to find an accepted method or equation for determining abutment scour at a 
bridge with very precise data much less a simplified method for determining the 
scour vulnerability of bridges across a region. Most studies of abutment scour have 
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been limited to computer simulations or very controlled laboratory experiments for 
a small subset of abutment types (Oh et al., 2009). Nonetheless, abutment scour 
seems to be more prevalent than pier scour during hurricane events since it 
undermines the soil at the toe of the abutment and can cause more immediate 
damage to the bridge structure. 
One method for determining abutment scour was put forth by Froehlich 
(1989) and is based on a multiple linear regression analysis that was run on 
laboratory measurements of abutment scour for two conditions at the bridge site: 
live-bed and clear water. Live-bed scour occurs when the scour hole at the abutment 
is replenished by material roughly the same size as the supporting soil. Clear water 
scour occurs when the material that is carried by the flow is much smaller than the 
soil that initially supported the abutment (Froehlich, 1989). Froehlich (1989) 
developed an equation for each type of scour at the abutment based on the shape of 
the abutment, inclination angle, flow around the abutment, area of the abutment, 
and the particle diameters of the soil. These equations require many parameters to 
be known about the soil and the properties of the bridge abutment, but it is possible 
to create a probabilistic form of these equations that utilizes the uncertainties in the 
parameters to estimate the scour at each bridge. Another method stems from the 
SRI COS method and is applied to abutments through additional input information to 
account for abutment type, shape and setback from the water's edge and increased 
complexities in the core equations to include the eddy effects around the abutments 
(Briaud and Oh, 2010). Despite the increased complexities from the pier scour 
equations, the SRI COS method for abutment scour is generally less conservative (i.e. 
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does not have a built in factor of safety) than other predictive models (Oh et al., 
2009), and is adopted in this study to be consistent across both pier and abutment 
scour. 
2.3.6. Embankment Scour Research 
Finally, embankment scour encompasses both the soil erosion of the embankments 
leading up to the bridge abutment and the undermining of soil beneath the 
approach spans to the bridge. By far, this was the most severe of the forms of scour 
evidenced in Hurricane Katrina (DesRoches, 2006), and to a lesser extent in 
Hurricane Ike. One possible reason for this could be that the soil beneath the 
approach spans does not often experience water flowing perpendicular to the 
roadway on a regular basis unlike the soil at the piers and abutments (because most 
flow generated from rainfall will be overland flow that will run in the direction of 
the roadway towards the stream/river in most cases, whereas piers and abutments 
experience perpendicular water flow regularly due to the flow of the stream/river) 
and thus has greater potential for the storm surge velocity to be able to move the 
soil particles. Another reason could be that, especially in older bridges, there is a 
higher likelihood that a bridge pier or abutment could have already experienced 
water velocities equal or greater than that of the storm surge and thus have already 
reached its maximum scour depth, resulting in little or no additional scour (Briaud 
et al., 2001a). Regardless of the reason why embankment scour is usually the most 
severe in hurricane events, this undermining of soil at the approach spans can cause 
the roadway that the soil is supporting to collapse, and the bridge to be impassable 
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(DesRoches, 2006). Currently there are no widely accepted models to predict 
embankment scour at bridges that can be applied on a regional scale for hurricane 
storm surge. There are some studies on embankment erosion of levies during 
hurricanes, but they are not applicable to small scale bridge embankments 
(Powledge et al., 1989a, Powledge et al., 1989b ). Therefore, part of the research for 
this study will be to adapt the current knowledge from SRI COS and erosion rates of 
soils to develop a qualitative approach to embankment scour that defines risk levels 
for the bridges in the study area. 
2.4. Hurricane Risk Assessment Models for Bridge and Roadway 
Systems 
Understanding the forces that act on the bridge under wave action or estimation of 
scour given surge and fluid flow is only the first step to understanding how coastal 
storms affect the road and bridge transportation systems. The next step is being 
able to quantify the likelihood of damage to all the bridges in a region. This is done 
through a vulnerability frisk assessment. Because predicting the performance of 
bridges under hurricane loading has a significant amount of inherent uncertainty, 
the vulnerability of said bridges is best defined in probabilistic terms. In fact, the 
very concept of risk, which refers to the potential for damages or losses that can be 
associated with an event, implicitly requires the identification of the hazard 
potential as well integration of the hazard potential with the probability of damage 
andfor the effects of the damage (Ellingwood and Wen, 2005). Alternatively, studies 
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based on scenario events can be applied to gain a better understanding of the 
consequences and failure potential under the case study storms. Nationwide risk 
assessment packages, such as HAZUS-MH offered by FEMA (Basoz and Mander, 
1999), address multiple hazards; however, these packages do not currently contain 
appropriate input models to assess risks to bridge and transportation infrastructure 
posed by hurricanes. 
While much work has been done to understand the risk to bridges in other 
natural hazards, like earthquakes, through the application of empirical or analytical 
fragility curves in a risk assessment (Basoz and Kiremidjian, 1999, Alipour et al., 
2010, Yang et al., 2009, Kang et al., 2008, Kiremidjian et al., 2007, Lee et al., 2011, 
Rokneddin et al., 2011, Zhou et al., 2010), very little work has been conducted to 
quantify the risk that hurricanes pose to the coastal infrastructure systems. Until 
recently, the traditional "risk assessment" methods for a coastal region given a 
storm surge were based on inundation maps of some sort (CCSP, 2008). Sometimes 
the inundation would be based both on storm surge simulations and the elevation of 
the bridge, but most of the time inundation maps only included surge information 
and any bridge in the surge zone was considered at risk, without any quantification 
of the susceptibility to damage or consequences of the event other than 
documenting the surge height. The few studies that have examined risk to 
transportation systems from hurricanes have usually been limited to analysis 
empirical evidence (Padgett et al., 2009, Douglass et al., 2004); however, Chen et al. 
(2007) presented a methodology for emergency risk management that focuses on 
28 
understanding the vulnerability of roadways to hurricane storm surge and wave 
forces (Chen et al., 2007). 
Following Hurricane Katrina a few empirical fragility curves were derived 
based on the damage to the Louisiana bridge system, the first of their kind; however, 
these fragility curves were not differentiated by bridge type or design details, 
instead giving a probability of damage state exceedance for a given surge height 
generic to bridges typical to the region (Padgett and Arnold, 2009, Padgett et al., 
2009). Figure 2.3 provides an example of the empirical fragility curves calculated 
based on statistical analysis of the observed damages and hind cast surge elevations 
from Hurricane Katrina (Padgett et al., 2009). Given the limitation of statistically 
significant data for differing bridge types, damage levels and design details, 
analytical and simulation based fragility analysis of bridges under hurricane loading 
has been prompted. Specifically, Ataei and Padgett (2011) proposed a method for 
bridge deck unseating fragility analysis, which is adopted in this study. Further 
details on this method are summarized in Chapter 4 of this thesis; however this 
method and other analytical fragility analysis of coastal bridges under hurricane 
threats cannot be conducted without a comprehensive database of coastal bridge 
information. Therefore, a major portion of this research is to build a database for the 
Houston/Galveston area that facilitates the development of bridge specific analytical 
fragility curves for bridge deck uplift. Such fragilities can be integrated with 
probabilistic hazard estimates or scenario hurricane events, marking a significant 
advance over existing risk assessment models for coastal bridge and transportation 
infrastructure limited to presence in an inundation zone. 
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Figure 2.3: Fragility Curves for Bridge Damage Conditioned upon Surge 
Elevation Based on Empirical Data from Hurricane Katrina (Padgett et al., 2009). 
As far as scour is concerned, calculating scour depth has been used during 
the design phase to determine the maximum scour depth, and more recently, due to 
many scour-related bridge failures, during inspections to determine if a bridge is 
scour critical and in need of scour countermeasures. The Department of 
Transportation requires all water crossing bridges to be inspected for scour 
regularly because of the risk that scour poses to bridges across the whole of the US; 
however, the method for inspecting bridges varies from state to state and relies 
mostly on visual inspection with calculations only taking place if a bridge is 
considered at risk for scour (Govindasamy et al., 2008). Additionally, the scour 
calculated for these bridges is based on normal flows and not on an extreme event 
like a hurricane, and focuses on pier scour which has been seen in past hurricanes to 
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be a subordinate mode of failure to abutment or embankment scour (Froehlich and 
Fisher, 2000). There is a need to understand the risk that hurricanes pose to 
undermining the soil around bridges and under roadways to be able to have a 
clearer picture of risk to the transportation network; which is met by developing 
probabilistic models of pier and abutment scour and determining risk levels for 
embankment scour based on soil type and water velocity. There have been a few 
studies in creating probabilistic forms of existing scour methods (Johnson and Dock, 
1998, Bolduc et al., 2008); however, these methods have been limited to pier scour 
and are not entirely applicable to a regional suite of bridges because the 
uncertainties assumed in Johnson and Dock (1998) are specific to Bonner Bridge in 
North Carolina. 
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While significant research has been conducted on understanding the forces 
at an individual bridge for uplift or scour, there is a current need for emergency 
officials and decision makers to have a regional assessment of the risk that 
hurricanes pose to the overall inventory of bridges in a transportation system. This 
research project addresses this pressing need by applying probabilistic methods to 
account for uncertainty in the estimation of both uplift and scour to a new regional 
database of information in order to obtain risk maps for scenario hurricane events 
in the Houston/Galveston area. Many risk assessments of transportation systems 
(other than inundation maps) have focused primarily on evacuation from hurricane 
prone regions (Duenas-Osorio et al., 2010); however, the risk assessment presented 
in this study focuses on the state of the bridge network immediately following a 
hurricane event, allowing for better informed decision making about post-event 
recovery efforts and facilitating the prioritization of bridges for retrofit or 
rebuilding. This type of risk assessment, while routinely conducted for other 
hazards (Rokneddin et al., 2011), has not been applied to hurricane prone regions. 
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Chapter 3 
Data Collection and Inventory Analysis 
3.1. Importance of Data Mining 
One of the most crucial aspects of conducting a regional risk assessment is collecting 
all the necessary data to support analysis of the various types of vulnerability. 
Although historically, regional risk assessment of other types of hazards have 
conducted general fragility analyses of bridge classes, and then assigned each bridge 
in a region a class fragility (Basoz and Kiremidjian, 1999, Nielson, 2005, Choi et al., 
2004), this study attempts to enable a more refined, bridge specific fragility 
assessment. The structural reliability models under surge/wave as well as the scour 
estimates require detailed information about a given bridge not easily inferred by 
generic bridge classes defined by material and construction type. Therefore this 
study aims to characterize the important data to support regional risk assessment of 
bridge infrastructure in coastal regions. Collecting this data is easy enough for a 
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single bridge or even a small sub-set of bridges, but when applied to an entire 
region, such as the Houston/Galveston bay area, the matter of data collection 
becomes of upmost importance. Thus, much time and consideration is given to 
mining the pertinent data from many data sources as well as to performing site 
visits to bridges where data was unavailable or inadequate. This endeavor to 
develop a database structure for vulnerability assessment is intended to serve as a 
model for other coastal regions, and identify viable data sources to support such 
efforts. 
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The current bridge deck modeling, scour depth prediction and soil erosion 
calculations are all extremely data intensive. Even with a simplified analysis, data 
and data collection are vital to an accurate risk assessment since the reliability of 
the model rests on the amount of uncertainty inherent in the input data. Many 
sources of information already exist in the form of the National Bridge Inventory 
(NBI) database and the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) records; 
however, detailed information is also required for girder type and area, vertical 
reinforcement and soil type. Additionally, given the size and extent of the region in 
question, site visits to all 155 bridges would be unfeasible, thus a major portion of 
this research was to locate and piece together a comprehensive database of 
information that would include structural information as well as soil details and 
general characteristics for all the water-crossing bridges in the Houston/Galveston 
area. Collecting all of this information required compiling the NBI data for the state 
of Texas, spending months in the Houston branch TxDOT office gathering bridge 
inspection files and as-built files for every bridge available, finding a reliable source 
that would give soil type near each bridge in the area, and conducting a few 
specified bridge site visits when all other data sources were exhausted. This section 
will go into detail describing all the sources of data in the new Houston/Galveston 
database (which is available upon request), what assumptions were made with each 
and how these sources led to the final database. 
3.2. Data Sources Mined for Houston/Galveston Database 
3.2.1. National Bridge Inventory 
The National Bridge Inventory is a national database of bridges on public roads, 
including interstates, US highways, state and county roads that resulted from the 
enactment of the National Bridge Inspection Program to support safety inspection 
and evaluation of highway bridges (NBI, 2010). The database includes the bi-annual 
inspection data listed by state, and although it was not intended to support hazard 
risk assessment studies, it can provide a valuable starting point for any regional 
data collection. NBI is publicly accessible (NBI, 2010); however, some fields, such as 
the bridge identification number, are stripped to help ensure some safety and 
security of the data. There are over 100 items listed in the NBI data for each bridge, 
as described in the NBI Coding Guide (FHWA, 1995), although not every item is 
populated for each bridge. However, for the purposes of this study, only specific 
items were necessary (see Table 3.1). A complete description of all the items in the 
NBI database can be found in its coding guide online (FHWA, 1995), but a few 
distinctions must be made about the specific data pulled for this study (NBI, 2010). 
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Firstly, there are two main types of structures, those owned by state authorities, 
called on-system bridges, and those owned by private or local owners called off-
system bridges. This is an important segregating factor because there is typically far 
more information collected from on-system bridges than off-system ones. Another 
note is that the publicly available dataset was cross checked with additional data 
from TxDOT to ensure details such as the nearest mile marker, road carried, facility 
crossed and structure identification number (all data which had been stripped or 
duplicated in the online dataset) was valid. Pertinent items were extracted for all 
the bridges from NBI, and narrowed down into the Houston/Galveston bay area, as 
discussed in the next section. Table 3.1 below gives the NBI data label for each piece 
of information pulled as well as the item number associated with it (NBI, 2010). 
Data Label Item 
Number 
Structure Number- 8 
Includes identifiers for TxDOT districts, county, control area 
as well as a unique 3 digit identifier at the end that is stripped in the 
online database 
Features Crossed- 6 
The body of water, roadway or railroad crossed by the bridge 
Facility Carried- 7 
The road/railroad carried by the bridge 
Location- 9 
Gives a distance in miles from the nearest major intersection 
or landmark 
Latitude and Longitude 16,17 
Owner- 22 
Type of agency that actually owns the structure, generally 
denotes on and off system structures 
Year Built 27 
Skew- 34 
The acute angle of the constructed bridge 
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Data Label Item 
Number 
Navigable Vertical Clearance- 39 
Only tabulated for bridges that have boat traffic under them, a 
first estimate for height above water 
Service Under Bridge- 42B 
Yields the operation of facilities under the bridge and is 
particularly useful for denoting water-crossing bridges 
Structure Type- 43A,B 
Includes both the material type (concrete, steel, etc) and 
structure design 
Approach Structure Type- 44A,B 
Includes both the material type (concrete, steel, etc) and 
structure design 
Number of Main Spans 45 
Number of Approach Spans 46 
Length of Maximum Span 48 
Structure Length 49 
Bridge Width 51 
Table 3.1: Pertinent Data Mined from NBI for Houston/Galveston Database. 
3.2.2. Geographical Information Systems Data and Defining the 
Houston/Galveston Bay Area 
The next source of data consists of many geographical information systems (GIS) 
layers that are utilized in ArcMap to set the boundaries of the Houston/Galveston 
bay area, to extract the elevation at each bridge, and to visualize the spatial 
distribution of many of the data parameters and results (i.e. bridge type, soil type 
and probability of failure). ArcMap is a geographical information system which can 
take the file of bridge data from NBI and create a map of the bridge locations and 
data, along with some files that provide background and a geospatial reference for 
the bridge locations. For the purposes of this study, many GIS files were obtained 
from the GIS/Data Center at the Rice University Library, a full list of which is below 
(Table 3.2), including datasets on all the roadways, counties, inlets and bays of south 
Texas, as well as advanced LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) data for elevations 
of the entire region. After putting together a map of the Houston/Galveston bay area 
using the GIS files listed below, the research study area was defined as the entire 
Island of Galveston, Bolivar Peninsula and everything within a one mile radius of the 
edge of the Houston Ship Channel, Trinity Bay, East Bay and West Bay. This ensured 
that all the bridges that could potentially experience significant surge or wave 
heights were included without excessive data collection outside the surge zone. 
With the bay area now defined, the database of all Texas bridges was refined 
using a buffer tool in ArcMap so that only the bridges in the bay area were included. 
Furthermore, the key information obtained from GIS was the ground elevation at 
each bridge and the soil type at each location; the source of the soil type data will be 
discussed in Section 3.2.4 below. For the elevation, LiDAR elevation maps with a 
horizontal precision of +/- 10 ft were used, obtained from the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) online seamless server (USGS, 2011). The information 
from USGS is contained in small parcels, so several areas of LiDAR data were 
overlapped to eventually arrive at a map of the complete bay area region (see Figure 
3.1 below of LiDAR data). The USGS obtains these LiDAR elevations by sending 
pulses of a laser from LiDAR instruments fitted to various aircraft and measuring 
the time it takes to detect the returning light beam. When the LiDAR maps are made, 
they have all the buildings and landmarks on them; however, the data is post-
processed to remove structures and foliage to create a bare earth map. However, a 
significant drawback to the LiDAR elevation is that the laser beams to not reflect 
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completely off of water and thus do not give accurate elevations of either the water 
or the channel bottom. Because of this and the fact that the bridge locations from 
NBI are generally located at the center of the bridge (and thus, over water), the 
LiDAR elevation pulled directly from the given location would describe neither the 
water level elevation, nor the channel elevation. Thus, it was necessary to manually 
find the elevation (or create a new file of bridge locations using the first approach 
span) for each bridge at the first approach of the bridge. Also, taking the elevation at 
the beginning of the bridge assured that the elevation would be of the roadway level 
and not the ground beneath the bridge (as the bridge would be stripped out to give 
the bare earth map). This is an important distinction since items pulled from NBI 
and TxDOT files give the height from the bridge to the ground or water level and it is 
important to be consistent in the methodology for gathering the elevation data. 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Houston/Galveston Bay Area with LiDAR Data. 
GIS File Data Source 
State of Texas Texas State Data Center 
Counties of Texas Texas State Data Center 
Bathymetry of Texas Coastline NOAA 
Outline of Texas Coastline NOAA 
Galveston roads Texas State Data Center 
Houston Roads Texas State Data Center 
Major Roads throughout state Rice GIS/ Data Center 
LiDAR Elevation data USGS Seamless Server 
Texas Waterways Texas State Data Center 
Table 3.2: GIS Files Obtained and Their Sources for Houston/Galveston Database. 
3.2.3. TxDOT Data: Inspection Files and As-Builts 
The most important data source for regional database construction is the 
information from the local Department of Transportation (DOT) on bridges that it 
inspects and maintains. For this study, detailed inspection reports and bridge plans 
were obtained from TxDOT, primarily from the Houston District and Beaumont 
District offices. Inspection files were procured for all the water crossing bridges in 
the Houston/Galveston bay area. Beyond inspection files, bridge plans as actually 
constructed, called as-builts, were obtained for on-system bridges from TxDOT's in-
house database, TxDocs Online. These two data sources provide almost all of the 
necessary data for the bridge deck uplift vulnerability model, and it is from these 
sources that the most data is mined. The inspection files contain the bi-annual 
inspection form used to populate the NBI database, but usually go further in 
describing the type of bridge deck, the span lengths, and in most cases include a 
channel profile, which is highly useful in determining the distance between the 
water surface and the bridge deck as well as the channel elevations. Additionally, 
many of the bridges have been inspected for possible scour issues and this 
inspection is also included in the file, yielding valuable information such as pier 
type, abutment type and soil type. What cannot be mined from the inspection files in 
terms of structural attributes can usually be found in the as-built. For this study, the 
pages of most interest were the bridge overview pages along with the pages on 
bents and abutments where details such as the vertical reinforcement between 
bridge deck and substructure, girder type and size, pile size and length and pier type 
and size can be obtained. Table 3.3 below details which parameters can be found in 
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each of the inspection files and as-builts. Following that, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show 
examples of inspection file pages and as-built pages to assist any future regional 
data collection. From Figure 3.2 of the inspection file, note the red boxes which 
denote some of the details gathered for this specific bridge (i.e. bridge length, deck, 
width, deck type, and longest span). The as-built example in Figure 3.3 shows where 
to find typical pier size, dowel information (usually called bar D), and girder depth. 
NBI Inspection Scour Inspection As-Built 
Span Lengths Pier Tyge Span Lengths 
Girder Types Pier Geometry Pier /Pile Size 
Height of Deck Soil Type Height above Water 
Height of Asphalt Abutment Shape Vertical Reinforcement 
Channel Profile Attack Angle Presence of Shear Keys 
Number of girders Number of Piers Abutment Shape/ Setback 
Previous damage Presence of Rip Rap Soil Type 
Table 3.3: List of Information Mined from Each: NBI Inspection, Scour Inspection 






for tr.4lCmwl'tWCJr0 70 'h'IN910 &Nl 
Bridge Inventory Record 
District 20 County : ~ Cont-Sec : 0508-02 Structure:: 032 Route : --=ll:::I'-=1~0 _________ _ 
Feature Crossed · Lost/Old River & FM 565 Inspector's Signature-: -=--=--=-=-------- Date· 7119/06 




...,2::,:-~6-=-1\-;.:;li:.;." - -=E:..o:;.::f"-=FM:..:• . .: ....:3;.;:1;;:.80..:.._ _ _ ..,.------::--:---=:--~---- Maintenance Section: _;0~1~-------
29.49' 50.39" Longitude: W 94°48' 1.00" .Milepoint _1~9::.:.. 7.:..:40=5 _____ _ 
General Description· 
65 simple span prestressed concrete beam bridge on concrete pile bents. Bridge is on a 4-lane, 2-way controlled access main 
lanes with a high ADT (46.800 vpd). 
I Bridge Length · 5078 ft.l Lanes On : 
---- -
4 Lanes Under. 2 
Skew Angle 0 Deg. Bridge Rail: _T_S0_1 ____________ _ 
Clear \: 1dth Between: 112 ft ~ Rail">, 0 Pvmt Edges pproach Rdway Width _ _ s_s _ ft 
IDeck Type 8" Concret.e Deck 
Surfacing: N/A Vertical Over-Clearance:---- ft ~ Unimpaired 
Stringers Spans 1 - 65 
Type: Prestressed Concrete Beams Size See Plans umber See Plans 







Est Deck Overtopping Freq: 






Controlling Span Length (C-C bearings): ----- ft 
umber: 
Controlling Span Length (C-C bearings)- - - --- ft. 
D II - 100 D 3- 10 
D II- 100 D 3- 10 
D < 3 
D < 3 
Horizontal I Vertical Alignment: _<rll_ o_d_I_G_ ood ___ ____________________________ _ 
Date Built I Design Load: _1_9_9_2_1_HS2 __ o....:(p::_er-=-pl_a_n...:.s)~-----------------------------
Regulatory I Advisory Speeds: _6_5_m_:_ph_.:.::(po~st_e_d:....) I_N_I_A _____________________ =-------
Posted Load Restriction: 181 one 
Comments: 
Signature Dare 
Figure 3.2: Example of Inspection File Report for On-System Bridge. 
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Figure 3.3: Example of As-Built Interior Bent Page for Mining Pier Information. 
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3.2.4. Soil Type Data: SoilMart Online Database 
To conduct the scour analysis, at the minimum the general soil type for every bridge 
in the database must be obtained. Ideally, soil samples would be collected and tested 
for each site to characterize the erosion rate. However, to practically support a 
regional assessment with over 150 bridges in the Houston/Galveston bay area, soil 
erosion rates will be inferred based on soil type and past testing of similar classes of 
soil. The estimated initial erosion rates based on soil type are adopted from the 
simplified analysis of Briaud et al. (2009) and discussed further in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis. For many bridges, the soil type is contained in the TxDOT scour inspection 
file, but not for every bridge in the bay area region; thus, there is a need for a 
reliable and consistent source documenting soil type throughout the Houston 
region. This source of soil type information was found in SoilMart (NCRS, 2011), an 
online database with basic soil types for large areas of land. There are some 
limitations to the SoilMart database; the soil type obtained from a representative 
sample is generalized across wide swaths of land (up to several hundred acres) and 
so site specific variation in soil type verses the representative sample can exist. 
Additionally, the representative samples are only obtained for the first five feet of 
depth, so it does not give an accurate view of the soil stratification. However, for the 
purposes of this study, general soil types from the SoilMart database are adopted so 
as to assign an erosion rate for the scour susceptibility analysis. It is acknowledged 
that future studies could conduct more refined site specific geotechnical 
investigation. From the online database, soil types were downloaded for the 
Galveston, Harris, Chambers and Liberty counties. 
3.2.5. Bridge Site Visits 
Even with the many sources of data that were mined for bridge geometry, channel 
properties and soil type, not every parameter could be determined for each bridge. 
Where the data mining process did not yield enough information for the regional 
risk assessment, bridge site visits were conducted. For this study, seventeen bridges 
were visited to determine soil type (if the SoilMart database and the scour 
inspection did not agree), pier geometry and type, and most importantly, abutment 
geometry, type and setback from the water. Information on the abutments of the 
bridges is the most difficult to locate in the traditional sources listed above, and thus 
limited abutment data was the primary driving force for conducting bridge site 
visits, although, once there, other parameters were also collected for verification 
purposes. Because lack of abutment data was the deciding factor on bridge site 
visits, the bridges were chosen based on their anticipated susceptibility to abutment 
scour. Bridges included in these site visits had to have previous scour damage, be 
located in highly erodible soil, such as sand, and not be inundated based on the 
surge levels from a hindcast Hurricane Ike scenario event. This last proviso was 
added because when the bridge deck is inundated, embankment scour or soil 
erosion of the approach spans is a far more likely and dangerous risk than abutment 
scour (Briaud, 2011). Where there were bridges not included in the site visits that 
were still missing key information, the missing data was inferred based on the 
parameters from similar bridges in the area. Specifics on assumptions of missing 
data can be found in Appendix B. Table 3.4 below lists the information that was 
46 
gathered at each bridge site. The bridge site visits constitute the final data gathering 
mechanism for bridge and channel geometry. 




Attack Angle of Water to Pier and 
Abutment 
Abutment Type 
Abutment Setback from Channel's Edge 
Table 3.4: Data Obtained from Bridge Site Visits. 
3.2.6. Storm Surge and Wave Scenarios from the UT-Austin ADCIRC 
Modeling Group 
The probabilistic models of unseating and scour developed in this study can be 
integrated with probabilistic or scenario events to assess risks to the bridge and 
transportation infrastructure. For the case studies presented in this thesis, scenario 
hurricane events are considered based on input obtained from collaborators 
through the SSPEED Center (CHG, 2010). The UT-Austin Computational Hydraulics 
Group simulates coastal storms' movement and strength using Advanced 
CIRCulation models for surge and wind parameters and SWAN models for wave 
parameters (CHG, 2010). 
Three scenario events in the Houston/Galveston bay area were considered: 
the original hind cast Hurricane Ike; Hurricane Ike with 30°/o stronger wind speeds 
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at the original landing location; and a worst case scenario event called "Super Ike," 
which included 30% stronger wind speeds than Ike and a more southern landing 
position so as to impact Houston and Galveston more directly. For each of these 
scenarios, the output from the ADCIRC and SWAN modeling was post-processed and 
the following data was obtained for each bridge: peak surge elevation and wave 
height, wave period and water velocity at each time step in the simulation. The 
mesh developed by the UT-Austin Computational Hydraulic Group is the most 
precise mesh to be made for the Texas coast, with the grid for near-shore 
measurements about 50m by 50m. Additionally, the model and mesh for the Texas 
coat was validated on storms Alicia (1972), Brett (1999), Allen (1980), Carla (1961), 
Rita (2005) and Ike (2008), even modeling the "fore-runner effect'' seen in 
Hurricane Ike (Dawson, 2010). However, despite the increased accuracy of this 
ADCIRC model for the Texas coast, given the larger mesh size, there is uncertainty in 
the surge elevation and wave heights at the bridge site that must be accounted for in 
the predictive structural and scour models when looking at scenario events. 
3.3. Building the Houston/Galveston Bay Area Database 
With the various data sources identified, the database for the bridges of interest 
must be populated. From the NBI database and the defined area of the 
Houston/Galveston bay area, 155 bridges were identified as water-crossing (by NBI 
data) in the bay area, not including culverts and tunnels. Using the sources above 
and the data collected from them, the parameters given in Table 3.5 were collected 
or calculated for each bridge span of each bridge in the area. For those parameters 
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that were calculated or determined using other data, a more thorough description 
follows the table. 
Parameter Source/ Method of Calculation 
Bridge Type NBI/ Using number of spans, material 
type and girder type 
Number of Spans NBI 
Span Lengths Inspection Files, As-Built 
Bridge Deck Width NBI, Inspection Files 
Deck Material NBI 
Bridge Skew NBI 
Year Built NBI 
Location (Lat/Long) NBI 
Connection Details- dowel bar diameter As-Built 
and length 
Deck Height/ Asphalt Height Inspection Files, As-Built 
Girder Type/ Size Inspection Files, As-Built 
Number of Girders Inspection Files, As-Built 
Height above Water Calculated from Channel Profile, As-Built 
Water Depth Calculated from Channel Profile 
Bridge Deck Elevation ArcMap 
Channel Elevation Calculated from Bridge Deck Elevation 
and Channel Profile 
Scour Rating Scour Inspection 
Soil Type Soil Mart, Scour Inspection, As-Built, Site 
Visits 
Pier Type I Size Scour Inspection, As-Built, Site Visits 
Number of Piers Scour Inspection, As-Built, Site Visits 
Pile Lengths/ Size Inspection Files, As-Built 
Attack Angle of Water to Pier As-Built, Scour Inspection, Site Visits/ 
Calculated based on maps 
Abutment Type/ Size Inspection Files, As-Built, Site Visits 
Abutment Setback from Water As-Built, Site Visit 
Channel Type As-Built 
Surge Height UTAADCIRC 
Wave Height UTA SWAN 
Wave Period UTA SWAN 
Table 3.5: Parameters Collected for Houston/Galveston Database. 
3.3.1. Method for Calculating Parameters in the Houston/Galveston 
Database 
3.3.1.1. Determining Bridge Type 
Many of the parameters listed above are easily found in the available data sources; 
however, some parameters are calculated based on available data, such as bridge 
type, height above water, water depth and channel elevation. Determining bridge 
type is one of the more important facets of categorizing bridges in a regional area to 
ensure that the distribution of construction types is representative of other coastal 
regions, and to draw inferences based on observational data from past storms. For 
example, Hurricane Katrina revealed the vulnerability of low elevation multi-span 
simply supported bridges (Padgett et al., 2009). The first divide in bridge type is 
number of spans, easily determined from NBI. The second categorizing factor is the 
bridge material: concrete, steel or timber; and the last factor is the girder or deck 
type. The simplest categories for bridge type are as follows and can be determined 
by the number of spans and material alone: Single Span (SS), Multi-Span Simply 
Supported (MSSS) Concrete/Steel, and Multi-Span Continuous (MSC) 
Concrete/Steel. A more detailed analysis of bridge types is usually desired and thus, 
from the structure type in NBI, more specific categories of bridge type can be 
defined as follows: SS Concrete Box Multiple, SS Concrete Girder, SS Concrete Slab, 
MSSS Concrete Box Multiple, MSSS Concrete/Steel Girder, MSSS Concrete Slab, and 
MSC Concrete/Steel Girder. Unless listed as continuous in the material type, i.e. 
concrete continuous or steel continuous, each bridge is assumed to be simply 
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supported. All bridges that do not fall into the explicitly labeled categories above, for 
example, timber, masonry, aluminum or iron bridges as well as trusses, arches and 
suspension bridges, are categorized as Other. Additionally, culverts and tunnels 
were excluded from the analysis. Table 3.6 lists the material and structure types 
found in NBI. Below that Tables 3.7 and 3.8 define which material and structure 
types determine which classifications for a bridge. 
Material Type (MT) and NBI ID Structure Type (ST) and NBI ID 
0 Concrete 1 Slab 
2 Concrete Continuous 3 Stringer/ Multi-Beam or Girder 
4 Steel 5 Girder and Floorbeam System 
6 Steel Continuous 7 Tee Beam 
8 Prestressed Concrete 9 Box Beam or Girders- Multiple 
10 Prestressed Concrete Continuous 11 Box Beam or Girders- Single 
12 Wood or Timber 13 Frame 
14 Masonry 15 Orthotropic 
16 Aluminum, Wrought Iron or Cast 17 Truss- Deck 
Iron 
18 Other 19 Truss- Thru 
20 Arch- Deck 
21 Arch- Thru 
22 Suspension 
23 Stayed Girder 
24 Movable Lift 
25 Movable- Bascule 
26 Movable- Swing 
27 Tunnel 
28 Culvert 
29 Mixed Types 
30 Segmental Box Girder 
31 Channel Beam 
32 Other 
Table 3.6: Material Types and Structure Types of Bridge Decks (NBI, 2010). 
Classification - Basic Spans Material Type Structure Type 
SS Concrete 1 1,5 Any 
MSSS Concrete >1 1,5 Any 
MSC Concrete >1 2,6 Any 
SS Steel 1 3 Any 
MSSS Steel >1 3 Any 
MSC Steel >1 4 Any 
Other Any 7,8,9,0 Any 
Table 3.7: Basic Classification Guide for Bridges in the Houston/Galveston Bay Area. 
Classification- Detailed Spans Material Type Structure Type 
SS Concrete Box Multiple 1 1,5 5 
SS Concrete Girder 1 1,5 2,3 
SS Concrete Slab 1 1,5 1 
MSSS Concrete Box Multiple >1 1,5 5 
MSSS Concrete Girder >1 1,5 2,3 
MSSS Concrete Slab >1 1,5 1 
MSC Concrete Girder >1 2,6 2,3 
MSSS Steel Girder >1 3 2,3 
MSC Steel Girder >1 4 2,3 
Other Any 7,8,9,0 7-22, 0 
Table 3.8: Detailed Classification Guide for Bridges in the Houston/Galveston Bay 
Area. 
3.3.1.2. Calculating Height above Water 
An extremely important value for determining inundation and relative surge level is 
the distance between the mean water level and the deck or underside of the bridge. 
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For this study, the height above water was usually determined in one of two ways, 
either from the channel profile or from the bridge profile in the as-built. The channel 
profile lists various points along the bridge length, usually every span, and a 
measured distance to the channel bottom, along with an average of the distance to 
the water level. Height above water for most spans is simply the measured distance 
to the water level; however, the height to the ground below the bridge span was 
substituted for height above water for spans with no water beneath them. For those 
bridges where a channel profile was not available, an estimate of height above water 
was taken from the bridge overview pages in the as-built. Using Adobe PDF and its 
measurement tools, the relative distance between the bridge deck and the water 
level could be ascertained from the as-built and the actual distance then calculated 
by using the scale provided on the bridge plans. In the example of the as-built below 
(Figure 3.4), note the red arrows which measure the distance from deck to water on 
the plan. Additionally, in Figure 3.5 of the channel profile, the key aspects are 
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If measurements were taken with any device other than a drop Une or tape measure, please describe method on reverse side of form. 
Please record any important comments on the reverse side. 
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Figure 3.5: Example of Height above Water from Channel Profile. 
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3.3.1.3. Calculating Water Depth 
Similar to height above water seen in the figures above, water depth was calculated 
primarily from the channel profile. For most bridges calculating the water depth is 
straightforward. If the bridge is flat, or does not change elevation over its length, the 
water depth for each span is found by subtracting the height above water from the 
given distance between the bridge deck and the channel bottom (see Figure 3.6). 
Most bridges fall into this category, and any bridge with less than 8 spans was 
assumed relatively flat. However, calculating the water depth becomes more 
complicated when elevation change in the bridge is taken into account and some 
assumptions must be made. First, for most of the longer bridges with elevation 
change, the height above water for each span was calculated from the as-built (see 
Figure 3.4 above) rather than from the channel profile to account for the changing 
bridge elevation. From there the distance to the channel bottom of each span was 
still obtained from the channel profile, and the water depth could be calculated by 
subtracting the height above water (see Figure 3.7). The biggest assumption made 
here is that the height above water does not change significantly over time, since the 
as-built is from the date of construction, unlike the channel profile measurements 
which are completed on a bi-annual basis. 
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A- top of bridge railing 
8-
X 
G - water level 
y 
H- channel bottom 
Given: A-8, A-G, and A-H from channel profile 
x is the height above water 
y is the water depth 
if (A-G)> (A-H) then, 
x=(A-G)- (A-B), otherwise 
x=(A-H) - (A-8) 
y=(A-H) - X - (A-8) 






Given A-8 , A-H, x from as-built 
Assume G is a constant elevation 
y = (A-H)- X- (A-B) 
Figure 3.7: Schematice of Height above Water and Water Depth Calculation for 
~~Changing Elevation" Bridges. 
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3.3.1.4. Calculating Channel Bottom Elevation 
After the height above water and the water depth was obtained for each bridge 
span, the channel elevation was determined by taking the elevation of the bridge 
deck for flat bridges and subtracting both the height above water and the water 
depth. For bridges whose elevation changes, the elevation from LiDAR was taken 
beneath the bridge at the channel level so as to assume a constant water level, and 
the channel elevation was found by subtracting the water depth, and the bridge 
elevation by adding the height above water, as illustrated in the figure above. 
3.3.2. Determining Bridge Subsets for Modeling Purposes 
Once all the data had been collected for each bridge in the bay area, subsets of the 
database must be created for each of the four vulnerability models based on the data 
available. For instance, the bridge deck uplift model is not suited for running timber 
structures or skewed structures at this time. Thus, the uplift data set of bridges 
contains 136 bridges for which there is sufficient data and model applicability. 
However, the subset for bridge deck uplift could be expanded in the future if models 
appropriate for timber and skewed bridges are created. Likewise, pier scour 
analysis is only relevant for those bridges with more than one span, as single span 
bridges generally have no piers in the water; thus, the data set for pier scour is 123 
bridges. The abutment scour model is only valid for bridges whose abutments are 
not already protected by scour countermeasures like riprap. Hence the subset for 
abutment scour is 109 bridges. Finally, embankment scour analysis is conducted for 
the complete 155 bridge database. 
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3.4. Statistical Analysis of Houston/Galveston Bridge Inventory 
Database 
After gathering all the pertinent data, a basic statistical analysis was conducted to 
better characterize and understand the bridges in the area and to draw some initial 
insights on the susceptibility of the Houston/Galveston bay area to hurricane 
threats. Some statistics were calculated using the entire database of 155 bridges 
(those pertinent to scour and general vulnerability, such as age of structure) while 
other statistics such as bridge superstructure classification were calculated using 
the database of 136 bridges that were included in the bridge deck uplift. First, the 
bridges were classified following the detailed classification scheme described above. 
Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of bridges by detailed classification type. As has 
been demonstrated in both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ike, Multi-Span Simply 
Supported Bridges (MSSS) are typically the most vulnerable to bridge deck uplift 
due to the lack of continuity between spans and the limited vertical resistance 
connecting each span to the substructure (Padgett et al., 2009, Stearns and Padgett, 
2011). When looking at the Houston/Galveston bay area, it is seen that 68% of the 
bridges in the area are MSSS classified, and may be of critical importance when 
evaluating the risk to uplift. Upon a closer look closer at the detailed classifications, 
it can be seen that over half of the MSSS bridges are Concrete Girder type, but the 
other half consist of Concrete Box Beam and Concrete Slab. Because of this, the 
bridge deck uplift model incorporates all of these superstructure types in order to 
fully characterize the risk to the bridges in this area. 
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Bay Area Bridges by Classification 
SS Concrete Girder 
4% 
SS Concrete Box 
Multip le 
10 
MSSS Steel Gird 
1% 
M SC Steel Girder 
3% 
Figure 3.8: Pie Chart of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area Bridges by Classification 
Type. 
Figure 3.9, presented below, shows the distribution of bridges in the 
Houston/Galveston bay area based on the age of the structure. From this, it is clear 
that over half of the bridges in the Galveston bay area are over 3 5 years old. While 
not considered in this thesis, future research could investigate the risks from both 
extreme events and deterioration of aging structures in the Houston/Galveston bay 




>60 Y ar 
• 35-60 ears 
10-35 'Year 
• <10 '"ear 
Figure 3.9: Pie Chart of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area Bridges by Age. 
Also, a parameter of interest for both scour and uplift is the distance between 
the bridge deck and the water level. This information, when coupled with storm 
surge data, can determine the relative surge height of the bridge as well as whether 
or not the bridge is inundated, a measure of short-term impassability. Also, studies 
on the damages from Hurricane Katrina noted that the most severely damaged 
bridges had a low elevation over the water level (Padgett et al., 2009). As seen in 
Figure 3.10 below, 68% of the bridges in this area are less than 15ft above the mean 
water level and thus would be inundated at that surge. Hurricane Ike reached surge 
heights of 14ft some places in the Houston Ship Channel so an even stronger storm 
or one that would hit Houston and Galveston more directly may have more 
devastating results on the bay area transportation system. 
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Ba~T Area B1idges by Height above \\ater 
• 0-5 ft (0-1.52111 
• 5-1 5ft (1 .53-4 .57111 
• 15-30 ft ( 4 .58-9 .14111) 
• 30-65 ft 9 .14-19 .81111) 
Figure 3.10: Pie Chart of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area Bridges by Height above 
Water. 
For scour determination, one of the key parameters is the type of soil located 
at each bridge site; thus, a statistical view of the soil types in the Houston/Galveston 
bay area could yield unique insights into the scour problem (Figure 3.11). Based 
solely on the soil type, there is some reason to believe that the bridges in the 
Houston/Galveston region may be more resistant to scour than in other areas. From 
the statistics in Figure 3.11, the bay area bridge could experience less scour due to 
58°/o of the bridges being located in clay soil which is the most erosion resistant of 
soil types, rock not included. However, 9°/o of the bridges are also found in the most 
erodible soil type, sand, and are therefore, the most susceptible to scour related 
problem. 
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Bay Area Bridges By Soil Type 
• sand • sandy Clay • Silty-Sand • clay-Silt • clay 
Figure 3.11: Pie Chart of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area Bridge by Soil Type. 
As can be seen by a basic statistical analysis of the database, the case study 
bridges in the Galveston Bay Area are typically older, low elevation, multi-span 
simply supported bridges. Given the evidence from past hurricane events, these 
types of structures are particularly susceptible to unseating under storm surge and 
wave loading. Therefore, a hurricane risk assessment of the bay area bridges should 
explicitly consider probability of span shifting or unseating. Scour may be somewhat 
less pressing based on the predominant soil type, but given empirical evidence, the 
issue of scour cannot be discounted without a more thorough examination of the 
problem through probabilistic scour depth modeling. 
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Chapter 4 
Vulnerability Modeling of Bridge Deck 
Uplift 
With the database of the Houston/Galveston bay area completed, fragility models 
for the two failure modes are needed in order to assess the vulnerability of the 
bridges in the database. As seen in empirical evidence from past hurricanes, bridge 
span displacement or removal is the leading cause of complete bridge failure during 
coastal storm events, both in cost and frequency. As such, fragility models from 
bridge deck uplift are required to determine the failure probability for each bridge. 
However, while the new AASHTO specifications gives guidance to determining the 
wave and surge loads on new design, previously there have been no probabilistic 
models to determine the risk to existing bridges accounting for the uncertainty in 
both the bridge capacity and the hurricane demand. Ataei and Padgett (2010b) 
recently proposed a first methodology to develop fragility surfaces for the span 
shifting and unseating failure mode of coastal bridges. Their model will be used in 
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the regional assessment conducted herein to evaluate the performance of bridges 
during hurricanes. Although further details on the probabilistic model can be found 
in Ataei and Padgett (2010b), an overview of the methodology is provided below 
along with details of how it is applied to the Houston/Galveston bay area. 
4.1. Background on Fragility Modeling and Methodology for 
Uplift 
Fragility modeling aims to determine the conditional probability of failure for a 
structure given a level of hazard intensity measure (IM). Fragility curves or surfaces 
are obtained by comparing the capacity (C) of a structure to the demands (D) 
experienced across a range of IMs, thereby determining a failure probability of the 
structure at each IM value. Ataei and Padgett (2010b) showed that the unseating 
fragility of coastal bridges is best depicted by a fragility surface with a vector of 
intensity measures (Ataei and Padgett, 2010a). 
Equation 4.1: Probability of Damage Given Intensity Measures (Ataei and Padgett, 
2010b). 
where Zc is the relative surge elevation, Hmaxis the maximum wave height, and s1 • s2 
are the values at which the failure probability is being computed. To evaluate this 
conditional probability statement, Ataei and Padgett (2010b) found that an 
assessment of static vertical uplift demands relative to probabilistic capacity 
models, instead of a full dynamic analysis for each bridge, was sufficient to assess 
65 
unseating fragility of typical low capacity connection bridges as found in the 
Houston/Galveston bay area bridge inventory. This approach thus reduces the 
computations needed to conduct a regional risk assessment, enabling bridge specific 
fragility assessment and making the model more efficient for quickly determining 
which bridges are in the most danger of failure. 
The methodology adopted compares the vertical capacity of each bridge span 
to the vertical uplift force caused by storm surge and waves, and failure is defined as 
the force exceeding the capacity. Figure 4.1 below shows the methodology 
schematically and more details on the approach to evaluate both demand, capacity 
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of Static Reliability Assessment for Span Unseating. Adapted 
from Ataei and Padgett (2010b). 
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4.1.1. Demand Modeling in the Bridge Deck Uplift Model 
Ataei and Padgett (2010b) provide a detailed discussion of the approach for 
probabilistic analysis of the demand generated by hurricane induced surge and 
wave as adopted in this study. Their model builds heavily upon the new AASHTO 
(2008) guide specifications for bridges vulnerable to coastal storms in which 
estimates of the peak forces on bridge decks are presented based on extensive 
studies by Marin and Sheppard (2009). These models were tested with field data of 
the 1-10 Escambia Bay Bridge and a physics- based model to show accuracy in 
theory and practice. A review of the AASHTO wave force estimates is provided 
forthwith. 
As mentioned earlier, the vertical force on a bridge is composed of four parts, 
an impact force due to trapped air between the water and the bridge deck, as well as 
the quasi-static forces of drag, inertia and buoyancy. The maximum quasi-static 
vertical force per unit length is estimated as: 
Equation 4.2: Maximum Quasi-Static Vertical Force per Unit Length (AASHTO, 
2008). 
where Yw is the unit weight of water, HMAX is the wave height, ds is the total water 
depth during the storm surge, and Tp is the wave period. B is a coefficient that takes 
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into account the position of wave crest with respect to the bridge deck. Coefficients 
bo to b6 are defined by the geometric properties of the deck, and TAF is a factor to 
adjust the vertical quasi static force for the effects of entrapped air. Additionally, W , 
x andy are given below: 
w -If-< 0.15, then W = 0.15W 
w 
H 





Equation 4.3: Variables W x andy (AASHTO, 2008). 
I 
where Zc is the relative surge elevation, positive if the storm water level is below the 
bottom of the cross section, W is the bridge width and it is the wave length. Wave 
length is usually difficult to determine when predicting or hindcasting hurricanes, 
however a relationship between wave period and wave length has often been 
suggested in past research. For example, AASHTO suggests the following equation to 
relate wave length and period: 
Equation 4.4: Wave Length Calculation (AASHTO, 2008). 
where g is the gravitational constant, and ds and Tp are defined as before. The 
impulse like force, also known as the slamming force, is also defined by AASHTO per 
unit length by: 
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2 HMAX ( )
B 
Fs = Ay wH MAX -A,-
Equation 4.5: Impulse/Slamming Force (AASHTO, 2008). 
where A and B account for the position of both the surge and wave crest with 
respect to the bridge deck. For a full account of the peak wave force equations, along 
with equations for the many coefficients, see AASHTO (2008). 
With these models, the maximum uplift force, Fvt can be calculated by 
summing the slamming force with the quasi-static force and removing the bias in 
the estimation of these forces along with accounting for the error inherent in the 
model itself. Equation 4.6 shows this below where Llb used to account for the bias in 
the determination of the wave forces and E1 is a random variable with lognormal 
distribution used here to capture the model error. 
Equation 4.6: Maximum Uplift Force with Bias Estimation (Ataei and Padgett, 
2010b). 
The bias function and model error are adopted directly from Ataei and 
Padgett (2010a), who conducted a statistical analysis of experimental data relative 
to AASHTO predictive equations. These analyses enable an application of the 
predictive equations for peak demands on bridge deck in the probabilistic analysis, 
and remove conservatism traditionally inherent to code based equations. 
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Based on the findings of Ataei and Padgett (2010a), two parameters are 
considered as the intensity measures that the demand and subsequent fragility 
surfaces are conditioned upon- relative surge height, Zc and wave height, Hmax· 
Most hindcast models of storms provide information on wave height as the 
significant wave height instead of maximum wave height called for in the model. Thus, 
the maximum wave height, Hmax• is determined to equal to1.8 Hs (AASHTO 2008). The 
wave period is then correlated to the maximum wave height by the Longuet-Higgins 
(1983) joint probability distribution: /(;,7]) = L(; I 77) 2 exp {-L[1 + (1-.!_ )2 ~]} where 
2 7] v 
'and 17 are dimensionless wave height and wave period respectively, and are given by the 
equations below: 
;=HI~; m0 =(H,/4) 2 ; 
77 =TIT 
Equation 4.7: Dimensionless Wave Height and Wave Period in the Longuet-Higgins 
Joint Probabilisty Distribution. 
where L is a constant, defined as (1 + ~) ,)_ ; mo is the first spectral moment, f is 
4 -v2nv 
the mean wave period, and v is the bandwidth of the wave spectral density. In 
addition to accounting for this uncertainty in wave period for a given wave height, 
other random variables are also considered in the fragility analysis, shown in Table 
4.1. To remain consistent across both demand and capacity modeling, the deck 
thickness is taken as a uniform distribution where the thickness can vary from 95% 
to 105% of the value in the database. All other structural parameters are taken as 
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deterministic in the demand modeling. The next section describes the capacity 
analysis procedure adopted and associated random variables. 
4.1.2. Capacity Modeling in the Bridge Deck Uplift Model 
The capacity model presented in Ataei and Padgett (20 1 Ob) calculates the capacity of a 
bridge deck to resist vertical forces and consists of the weight of the deck and vertical 
connections between the deck and the substructure of the bridge. The weight per unit 
length of each span can be calculated using Equation 4.8 below. 
~ =(dbW+Ag xng)Y 
Equation 4.8: Weight per Unit Length of Bridge Span (Ataei and Padgett, 2010b) 
where Ws is the span weight per unit length, db is the deck thickness, W is the deck 
width, A9 is the cross section area of the girders, n9 is the number of girders and y is 
the unit weight of the material. Uncertainties in the density of materials and in the 
thickness of the bridge deck are considered following the distributions given in 
Table 4.1. The girder type, height and number of girders given by TxDOT are taken 
as deterministic parameters because the most common girder types are pre-cast 
and made off-site. 
Vertical connection between substructure and superstructure is usually 
manifested through anchor bolts or dowels bars in bridges in the coastal region. The 
contribution of this vertical connection, if it exists, can be determined by the pullout 
or yield strength of the bars. For anchor bolts, the equations are taken from ACI 318-
Appendix D and given in Equation 4.9 below with uncertainty taken into account: 
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Steel strength, Ns = Asefut 
Connection strength, Fe = nb x min A Concrete breakout strength, Ncb = _Jf_lf/21f/3Nb x &2 
A No 
Equation 4.9: Vertical Connection Strength (Ataei and Padgett, 2010b). 
where nb is the total number of bolts per span, Ase is the area of the bolt,fus is the ultimate 
strength of the steel, AN is the projected area of the failure surface for the anchor, A No is 
the projected area of the failure surface of a single anchor remote from edges, Np is the 
pullout strength in tension of a single bolt, lf/2 to '114 are modification factors. For more 
information, see explanations of the above equations in ACI 318 (ACI, 2005). Steel 
strength is based on mechanics of materials and thus no model error is associated with it. 
e2 and eJ are the model error terms as presented by Eligehausen et al. (2006) for concrete 
breakout and pullout strength respectively (Eligehausen et al., 2006). If the substructure 
and superstructure are connected via dowel bars the resistive force can be estimated by: 
Equation 4.10: Resistive Force of Dowel Bar Connections (Ataei and Padgett, 
2010b). 
where cpb is the bond strength, dse is the reinforcement diameter, lemb is the 
embedment length of the dowel, fy is the reinforcement yield strength, ld is the 
development length estimated based on (12- 1) in ACI 318 (ACI, 2005). The dowel 
bars are assumed to reach yielding if the embedment length is longer than the 
development length, otherwise pullout governs The pullout equation above, like 
steel strength, is based on mechanics of materials and thus no model error is 
associated with it, only uncertainty in the input parameters. The capacity of the deck 
per unit length therefore is obtained by summing the weight and the connection 
force: 
Equation 4.11: Capacity of Bridge Deck (Ataei and Padgett, 2010b ). 
Table 4.1 below lists the uncertainties accounted for in both the demand and 
capacity models, along with their various distributions. 
Wave and surge parameters 





Wave spectral density. 
Deterministic 
Normal 
2 Lower bound for uniform distribution, in percentage. 
3 Upper bound for uniform distribution, in percentage. 
4 Mean value of normal distribution. 
5 Standard deviation of normal distribution. 
6 Logarithmic mean. 
/ 2 = 95% m 
as = 0.23 
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7 Logarithmic standard deviation. 
8 (JCSS, 2001) 
9(Ellingwood and Hwang, 1985) 
Table 4.1: Sources and Distributions of Uncertainty in the Bridge Deck Uplift Model-
Ataei and Padgett (2010b). 
4.2. Fragility Surfaces for Bridge Deck Uplift Vulnerability 
As described in (Ataei and Padgett, 2010b), the fragility surfaces for each bridge 
span are evaluated across the range of combinations of surge elevations and wave 
heights. To propagate uncertainties in the random variables affecting capacity and 
demand, Monte Carlo sampling is conducted to obtain the distribution of the limit 
state function for each span, and then the distribution is integrated to estimate the 
probability of failure. 
The failure probability of each span in a bridge identified, the failure 
probability of the entire bridge is merely the combination of the effect of each span, 
where the bridge is modeled as a series system and if one span fails, the entire 
system fails. The spans in this case are considered to be independent, with 
continuous spans considered to be a single span where they are continuous. 
Ataei and Padgett (2010b) also looked at a fully dependent scenario for 
individual bridge spans and found that most of the bridges have narrow upper 
(independent) and lower (fully dependent) bounds with variations of less than 10% 
in the failure probabilities. 
In theory, the probabilistic approach described above can be applied directly 
to a given set of input storm data to evaluate the failure probability of a bridge. In 
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this study, the fragility surfaces are instead derived for each bridge in the 
Houston/Galveston bridge inventory database. This approach has the advantage of 
decoupling the hazard assessment from the vulnerability modeling to enable any 
number of future hurricane scenarios to be evaluated for the region. The fragility 
surfaces of each bridge along with the relative surge height and wave height from 
scenario hurricane modeling procured from the Computational Hydraulics Group at 
UT-Austin are used to obtain the probability of failure for scenario regional risk 
assessment. 
Four bridges from the Houston/Galveston bay area bridge inventory were 
chosen that demonstrate the differences in the fragility surfaces (Figures 4.2 and 
4.3) based on bridge deck type and connectivity. Some selected database 
information for each of the three bridges is given in Table 4.2 below. 
The differences in the fragility surfaces arise primarily out of differences in 
the capacity of the bridge to withstand the vertical uplift force. Therefore, the fields 
in Table 4.2 relate to the capacity parameters of weight and connectivity. Figures 4.2 
(a.) and (b.) show two MSSS Concrete Girder type bridges: one with connectivity 
between the deck and the substructure of the bridge and one with no connectivity. It 
is clear from a comparison of the two figures that the connectivity decreases the 
vulnerability of the bridge from vertical uplift due to the increased capacity of the 
bridge. Figure 4.3 (a.) gives the fragility surface of an MSSS Concrete Box Beam 
Multiple bridge. Note that the fragility surface for the MSSS Concrete Box Beam 
bridge with no vertical connections is similar to the MSSS Concrete Girder bridge 
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with vertical connections. It was documented during laboratory experiments on 
bridge decks that the effect of trapped air beneath girders can sharply increase the 
vertical uplift force; however, air entrapment does not occur as much at concrete 
box beam bridges and thus, the vertical uplift forces are generally smaller (Cuomo et 
al., 2009). Finally, Figure 4.3 (b.) shows an MSC Steel Girder bridge to draw contrast 
between the fragilities of continuous bridges with that of simply-supported. The 
MSC Steel Girder bridge, due both to its vertical connections and its continuity of 
spans, shows the least amount of vulnerability to storm surge and wave uplift 
forces. Future work on bridge deck uplift could explore the relationship between the 
various bridge capacity parameters and the resulting fragility surfaces. The next 
chapter will discuss a similar methodology employed to estimate the scour depths at 
bridges in the Houston/Galveston bridge inventory. 
Bridge ID Classification Vertical Median Deck Height 
Type Connections Span Width above 
Length (ft) Water 
(ft) (ft) 
12085B00535002 MSSS None 30 27 2.6 
Concrete 
Girder 
121020050807198 MSSS Dowels 30.33 35.7 5.9 
Concrete 
Girder 
121020AA3309001 MSSS None 23 28.3 3.5 
Concrete Box 
Beam Multiple 
120850050004220 MSC Steel Dowels 64 54.1 4.5 
Girder 
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Figure 4.2: Fragility Surfaces for MSSS Concrete Girder Bridges (a.) without Vertical 
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Figure 4.3: Fragility Surface for (a.) MSSS Concrete Box Beam Multiple Bridge 




Probabilistic Approach to Scour 
Vulnerability Modeling 
5.1. Overview of the Probabilistic Scour Models 
The last aspect of the risk assessment for this region is scour vulnerability modeling. 
This chapter goes into detail about the specific scour model used, drawing from the 
SRICOS method originally presented by Briaud et al. (2004) and accounting for the 
uncertainties in the input parameters and the inherent bias in the original model to 
obtain a probabilistic estimate of scour depth. The scour analysis builds upon work 
by Briaud and Oh (2010), with the initial erosion rate estimates for each soil type 
stemming from the simplified SRICOS method for TxDOT, presented in Briaud et al. 
(2009). All input parameters come from the bridge and soil database developed for 
the Houston/Galveston bay area, described in Chapter 3. Previous methodologies 
are deterministic in nature and/or yield only the maximum scour depth a bridge 
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could possibly experience, often with emphasis on lifetime exposure rather than 
extreme event situations. The approach herein (illustrated in Figure 5.1) evaluates 
the probabilistic model of scour for a set of relevant hurricane hazard parameters. 
Scour fragility estimates are then derived for prescriptive limit states, which state 
the probability of meeting or exceeding a prescribed scour level given the water 
velocity from the hurricane. 
First, the probabilistic pier and abutment models are discussed along with 
their associated input sources, uncertainties and limit states. Then, in both the pier 
and abutment model, fragility curves are presented to encompass a range of water 
velocities a bridge might experience during a hurricane event. Finally, a qualitative 
measure of embankment scour is described as a first pass at understanding the road 




Identify uncertainties in the input parameters and model 
(Tables 5.1 and 5.4) for the scour assessment 
Derive probabilistic estimates of 
scour depth (y5 ) for a given 
velocity using SRICOS 
Apply prescriptive limit states (L.S.) from 
Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.2, identifying limits 
when repair or interventions are needed 
Evaluate the fragility for each bridge 
Pr=P[y.,>L.S. I water velocity] 
Figure 5.1: Schematic Overview of the Probabilistic Scour Assessment. 
5.2. Probabilistic Pier Scour Modeling 
The first application of the simplified SRI COS method is in determining the probable 
pier scour depth after a hurricane event. Pier scour is a form of local scour that 
occurs when water displaces soil particles around a bridge pier or pile, causing a 
hole to form (see Figure 5.2 for an example). This type of scour is dangerous in that 
the scour hole lengthens the pier which causes the both the pier and the pile 
80 
81 
foundation to have a reduced capacity to resist lateral forces and, since pier scour 
occurs under water, this type of damage is not always immediately apparent, unlike 
deck displacement or soil erosion. Additionally, pier scour is the primary mode of 
scour failure in normal tidal and river flow events. Appropriately then, the SRICOS 
method was first designed for pier scour and is where this scour analysis starts. 
Horseshoe and Wake Vortices around a Cy4indrical Element T View 
Figure 5.2: Schematic of Pier Scour in a Stream (USGS, 2009). 
The pier scour equation from SRICOS is based on empirical scour findings 
and because of this is comprised mostly of coefficients determined by varying 
parameters of the bridge and/ or water source. Maximum pier scour depth, via the 
SRICOS or HEC-18 (clay) method, is given by: 
Ys = a' * K1 * Ksp * Kl * Kw * 2.2 * (2.6 * Frpier - Fr c(pier))"7 
Equation 5.1: Maximum Potential Pier Scour from Briaud and Oh (2010). 
where a' is the effective pier width based on the angle of attack of the water, K1 is 
the correction factor to account for pier type, Ksp is correction factor for the spacing 
of the piers, Kz is the correction factor that accounts for the aspect ratio of 
rectangular piers, Kw is the correction factor for the water depth effect, Frpier is the 
Froude number based on the velocity of the water approaching the pier, Fr c(pier) is 
the Froude number based on the critical water velocity and Ys is the maximum scour 
depth for given pier parameters. The effective pier width, a' is defined as: 
L 
a' = a* [cos(e) + -sin(O)] 
a 
Equation 5.2: Effective Pier Width (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
where a is the pier width, e is the attack angle the water makes with the pier, and L 
is the length of the pier (not the height of the pier). For most piles, which are square 
or cylindrical, the effective width is the same as the pier width. To determine the 
correction factor, K11 the differing pier types must be defined. In this study, there are 
three main piers types; round-nose, cylindrical and square-nose. Cylindrical is 
simply the piers that are cylinders, whereas square-nose accounts for all square and 
rectangular piers and round-nose includes all oval piers. With that in mind, the 
K1 factor is given by: 
{ 
1.0 ,fore> 30° 
K1 = 1.0 ,for roundnose and cylinder 
1.1,for rectangular 
Equation 5.3: Coefficient K1 for Pier Type (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
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The spacing correction factor is usually 1.0 but for bridges where the piles or 
piers are close together the coefficient is given as: 
Ksp = {2.9 * (~,) -.91 ,for ~' < 3.2 
1.0, otherwise 
Equation 5.4: Coefficient Ksp to Account for Spacing between Piers (Briaud and Oh, 
2010). 
In Equation 5.4 above, S is the spacing between piers. Kl in this study is 1.0 
for all ranges of Lja from the work of Briaud and Oh (2010). The water depth 
correction factor is defined as: 
{ (Yt)"
35 Yt Kw = 0.89 * a' ,for Q! < 1.43 
1.0, otherwise 
Equation 5.5: Correction Factor for Water Depth, Kw (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
where y1 is the water depth at the pier during the conditions examined (i.e. normal 
water depth for regular flow, storm water depth when looking at a specific storm 
event). The Froude numbers for the pier are given by Equation 5.6 below: 
Frpier = r::-:::-::; 
v g *a' 
Frc(pier) = r;:;-:;:-;:1 
vB*a 
Equation 5.6: Froude Numbers of Pier Given Assumed Velocity, V11 and Critical 
Velocity, Vc (Briaud and Oh, 2010) 
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where V1 is the given or assumed water velocity during the storm event, 1'c is the 
critical water velocity at which scour begins, given by the assumptions in Section 
5.2.1 below, and g is the gravitational constant (9.81 m/s). The maximum scour 
depth, y5 , can thus be obtained from Equations 5.1-5.6 above and then used in the 
SRI COS hyperbolic function (an example of which is given in Figure 5.3 below) to 
determine the scour depth of a pier given a storm of a specific duration and an initial 
erosion rate of the soil. This is shown in Equation 5.7 below: 
t 
Ytinal = 1 t 
-:-+-
zl Ys 
Equation 5.7: Pier Scour, Ytinal• for a Given Duration Event (Briaud et al., 2004) 
z (mm) 2000 
1000 
500 1000 1500 2000 
t (hrs) 
Figure 5.3: Example Graph of Scour Depth Verses Time from SRI COS Method (Briaud 
et al., 2004). 
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where t is time in hours, ii is the initial erosion rate, y5 is the maximum possible 
scour depth calculated using the above equations and Ytinal is the anticipated scour 
depth after time, t. The time for the storm is obtained from the ADCIRC data from 
the Computational Hydraulics Group at UT -Austin, as is the water velocity, and the 
initial erosion rate is determined based on soil type as given in Section 5.2.1 below. 
5.2.1. Uncertainties in Input Parameters and Bias in the Model 
With the base equations of the deterministic method presented, one unique 
component of this study is to account for the uncertainties in the input data, along 
with bias and model error, thereby yielding a probabilistic scour depth instead of a 
deterministic output. The uncertainties in the input data are given in Table 5.1 
below. Most of the structural parameters are taken as deterministic because piers 
and piles are often pre-cast and made off-site, allowing for greater certainty in the 
values of the pier width and length. Additionally, as soil type and pier type are 
discrete parameters, they are also adopted as deterministic values. It is 
acknowledged that assignment error is feasible, but not accounted for in this study. 
The attack angle of the water to the pier is taken to have a uniform distribution with 
+/- 5 degrees variation based on engineering judgment and review of plans relative 
to field studies. It is noted that the ultimate fragility curves are not conditioned upon 
storm duration or water depth, since preliminary sensitivity studies found the 
models to be relatively insensitive to these parameters. Given the significance of 
water velocity in affecting the scour depth, the fragility models developed in Section 
5.2.3 of this chapter are conditioned upon water velocity. However, in the case study 
hurricane scenario events presented in Chapter 6, a uniform distribution of+/- 5-
10% is adopted for water velocity, water depth and storm duration to account for 
potential model error associated with the hurricane simulations. An alternative 
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approach could be to fully decouple this hazard intensity variability and integrate 
the scour fragilities with random variables of water velocity. 
Water, Storm and Soil Parameters 




Table 5.1: Variables and Distributions with Uncertainties Accounted for in 
Probabilistic Pier Scour Model. 
The critical water velocity, Vc, and initial erosion rate, zi, are dependent upon 
the soil type. In ideal cases the critical water velocity and initial erosion rate are 
obtained by collecting a site specific soil sample from each bridge and testing it in 
the erosion function apparatus (EFA). To obtain these parameters without requiring 
a soil sample from each bridge site, Briaud et al. (2009) presented ((erodibility 
charts" for each soil type, based on 81 EFA tests, which give rough boundaries to the 
initial erosion rate and the mean and coefficient of variation (COV) of the critical 
water velocity. However, using the bounds for initial erosion rate and the given 
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mean and COV of critical water velocity introduces additional uncertainty to the 
analysis. 
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The hand-sketched bounds for initial erosion rate presented in the 
erodability charts by Briaud et al. (2009) are estimated as power laws (linear in the 
log-log space) herein, and the equations for the upper and lower bounds are shown 
in Table 5.3 below. The one exception of the form of the bound is the lower bound of 
soil type SP (see Table 5.2 below for definition) which fit a quadratic equation 
better. Therefore, the initial erosion rate used in this study is taken as a random 
value from a uniform distribution between the upper and lower bound, where the 
bound is a function of the water velocity, V1 • The critical water velocity, l{;, is 
represented by a normal distribution with mean and COV listed in Table 5.3 for each 
soil type (Briaud et al., 2009). It is noted that some assumptions are made when 
mapping from the erodability charts and critical water velocity estimates presented 
by Briaud et al. (2009) to the soil types in the case study region. For example, there 
are seven different soil types listed in the Houston/Galveston bridge database 
(given in Table 5.2 below); however, the erodibility charts only consider soil types 
CH, CL, SC and SP. Thus, the parameter estimates are extrapolated to other soil types 
in the region based on figures presented in Govindasamy et al. (2008) which plots 
EFA results for all soil types but does not include the hand-drawn initial erosion rate 
estimates. Based on a review of the few soil samples of CL-ML given in Govindasamy 
et al. (2008), CL-ML is assumed to have the same properties of CL for both Yc and ii. 
CH-CL, as a combination of fat and lean clays, is assumed to have a COV of Yc of 0.51, 
the mean of Yc equal to the average of the CH and CL means, an upper bound of ii 
taken from CL and lower bound taken from CL. Finally, ML-SP is assumed to have 
the same parameters as SC. 
I 
Specific Soil Type 
CH- Fat clays 
CL- Lean Clays 
CH-CL- Generic clay 
CL-ML- Clay- Silt 
ML-SP- Silty-Sand 
SC- Sandy Clay 
SP-Sand 
Table 5.2: Definitions of Soil Types Found in the Houston/Galveston Region. 
Soil Type Normal Distribution Uniform Distribution for Initial Erosion Rate 
for Critical Water (id 
Velocity (\'c) 
llvc(mjs) COVvc Lower Bound Upper Bound 
CH 0.73 0.51 .zi = 0.1128 * vt8431 ii = 9.8209 * Vl·611 
CL 0.51 0.52 ii = 0.2262 * Vl·4814 .zi = 31.687 * v,4 ·636 
CH-CL 0.62 0.51 .zi = 0.1128 * v1z .s431 .zi = 31.687 * v14.636 
CL-ML 0.51 0.52 .zi = 0.2262 * v13.4814 .zi = 31.687 * v,4 ·636 
ML-SP 0.63 0.45 .zi = o.1o42 * v,3 ·0013 ii = 44.03 * v,s.0854 
sc 0.63 0.45 ii = 0.1042 * Vl0013 .zi = 44.03 * v1s .oss4 
SP 0.17 0.24 ii = 570948 * V12 - .zi = 10267 * vt527 
33.355 * V1 + 5.0166 
Table 5.3: Assumptions on Critical Water Velocity Values and Bounds for Initial 
Erosion Rate (Briaud et al., 2009). 
In addition to the uncertainty in the input parameters, the inherent bias in 
the SRICOS method, called SRICOS model error in Table 5.1, is taken into account 
based on the work of Bolduc et al. (2008). In this work, Bolduc et al. (2008) 
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compared the maximum scour depth obtained by the SRICOS method with the 
actual maximum scour depth observed at bridges in the field within three databases. 
Based on those databases, Bolduc et al. (2008) found that for bridges built in 
cohesive soils, the bias was roughly 0.955 with an error estimator that has a 
lognormal distribution. For bridges built in sand, the bias was 0.44 7 with the same 
error estimator. The following equations present the bias removal and introduction 
of error estimate for the scour prediction equations of clay and sand sites 
respectively: 
Ysm(clay) = 0.955 * Ys * E 
Ysm (sand) = 0.44 7 * Ys * E 
Equation 5.8: Scour Depth Calculation with Bias Removal and Model Error Estimator 
(Bolduc et al., 2008). 
where Ys is the maximum scour depth calculated by SRICOS, and E is the error 
estimator with parameters given in Table 5.1. 
5.2.2. Capacity Limit States for Fragility Analysis 
With the methodology presented above, the probabilistic scour depth at a pier can 
be established given a scenario event or conditioned upon a hazard parameter such 
as water velocity. However, to support decision making, these probabilistic 
estimates of scour depth are compared to capacity limits at which TxDOT would 
usually repair or rebuild a bridge for pier scour. For this analysis, based on guidance 
from the geotechnical division ofTxDOT (Delphia, 2011), the limit state for repair is 
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taken as 1/ 8 of the embedded pile depth as given by TxDOT inspection files and as-
builts, or 2.75 ft if no pile depth is available. These numbers are based on the 
maximum allowable scour for a pile being half of the embedment depth (total pile 
length minus height from ground to bridge), and that TxDOT districts usually install 
countermeasures at about 1/ 4 of the maximum allowable depth. For failure 
(meaning TxDOT would close the bridge to repair /replace it), the limit state is taken 
as 1/ 4 of the pile depth based similar arguments above except that many districts 
would begin to close bridges with half or more of the maximum allowable scour 
depth in order to replace them (Delphia, 2011). When pile depth is not given, 5.5 ft 
is taken as the critical scour depth based on a generic 22 ft pile embedment length. 
This approach to limit state analysis is rooted in the identification of prescriptive 
capacity limits beyond which repair or closure of the bridge is anticipated. 
5.2.3. Fragility Analysis of Piers in the Houston/Galveston Bay Area 
Prior to conducting the regional case study analysis for various hurricane scenario 
events, fragility curves for all the bridges in the Houston/Galveston bay area were 
developed. These fragility curves state the probability of limit state exceedance 
given water velocity. Similar to the storm surge fragility modeling, Monte Carlo 
simulation is conducted with 7000 samples, using Latin hypercube sampling, of the 
random variables in Table 5.1 to compare realizations of the scour depth to the 
prescriptive limit states. From the point estimates of failure probability a fragility 
function is derived from regression analysis based on the least squares method. The 
results show that following a region of nearly zero failure probability, an 
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exponential regression model provides a good fit to the fragility point estimates for 
about half of the bridges in the inventory. In some cases a quadratic or a power 
regression provided a better description of the fragility for the few bridges that did 
not fit an exponential regression. The parameters of fragility curves for all bridges 
can be found in Appendix C. All of the regressions given in Appendix C have an R2 
over 0.81 with most coefficients of determinations over 0.97. 
Two example fragility curves are shown below for exceedance of the pier 
scour limit state (Figures 5.4 and 5.5). For most of the bridges, a discernible failure 
probability (limit state exceedance) does not occur until the water velocity is over 1 
mfs. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the points point estimates of failure probability for 
pier scour of bridges 10 and 122 respectively, with the associated fragility curve 
fitted to them. These two bridges were chosen to show the difference in fragility 
curves for bridges in sandy soils (Bridge 10) and in clay soils (Bridge 122). Note that 
the failure probability becomes non-negligible at different water velocities 
depending on the soil type (about .7 mfs for Bridge 10 and 1.5 mfs for Bridge 122), 
and that the two fragility curves have different shapes. 
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Points from Fragility Analysis 
-- Curve Fit- PO'INEir 
1 2 3 
Water Velocity (mfs) 
4 5 
Figure 5.4: Fragility Curve Fitting for a Bridge Pier in Sandy Soil. 
Fn.gility Curve of Pier Bridge122 
1~----~----~------~----~-=~~ 
Points from Fragility Analysis ............ 
-- Curve Fit- Exponential 
0.8 
0.2 
1 2 3 5 
Water Velocity (mfs) 
Figure 5.5: Fragility Curve Fitting for a Bridge Pier in Clay Soil. 
The median value, or water velocity associated with 50°/o probability of limit 
state exceedance is 4.64 mjs for Bridge 10 and 2.43 m/s for Bridge 122. This 
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statistic does provide some insight on the fragility, indicating that while the bridge 
in clay soil requires a higher velocity to initiate scour, once scour is initiated the 
probability of limit state exceedance increases quickly when compared to the bridge 
in sandy soil. However, extreme values are often of interest in structural safety and 
risk analyses. The fragility curves reveal that the 5th percentile and the 95th 
percentile for the bridge in sandy soil (Bridge 10) are 1.17 m/s and greater than 5 
mfs respectively. In comparison, they are 1.89 mjs and 3.87 mfs for the bridge in 
clay soil (Bridge 122). These fragility curves are predicated on the water velocity 
varying from 0 mjs to 5mjs and therefore any water velocity outside of this range 
(unlikely to occur in a hurricane event) cannot be predicted through extrapolation. 
The increased range between the 5th and 95th percentiles in the bridge in sandy soil 
highlights the increased uncertainty in the scour performance assessment of Bridge 
10. 
To further investigate the sensitivity of scour depth estimates, and hence 
introduction of variability in fragility analyses, tornado plots were created for each 
of the bridges, see Figures 5.6 and 5.7 below, to determine the greatest source of 
uncertainty in the scour estimates. The seven random variables previously 
presented in Table 5.1 were considered at their extreme (5th and 95th percentile 
values for normal and lognormal distributions, lowest and highest values for 
uniform distributions) and median values. For the analysis of scour depth 
sensitivity, one factor at a time is changes to its upper or lower level while the other 
variables are held at their median values. 
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The tornado plots reveal the relative importance of different sources of 
uncertainty, indicating the variation in pier scour depth estimates due to a range of 
potential parameter realizations relative to the median value case. To be consistent 
with the fragility analysis, the tornado plots were evaluated at the set water depth 
and storm duration for which the fragility analysis was conducted, and across a 
range of water velocities to determine if variation in the assumed velocity changes 
the relative importance of the variables. The values in the tornado plots do vary 
with smaller water velocities but converge after 1 mj s; thus, only one tornado plot 
is shown for each bridge taken at velocity 5 mjs. For the case studies presented, the 
scour depth estimate when all variables are at their mean value is 14.43 ft for Bridge 
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Figure 5.7: Tornado Plot of Sources of Uncertainty in Bridge 122. 
Based on the tornado plots, the error estimator from the bias removal term 
provided the largest source of uncertainty in all the bridges when the water velocity 
exceeded that which would initiate scour. Before that water velocity (0.7 mjs and 
1.5 mjs for Bridges 10 and 122 respectively), the initial erosion rate provided the 
most uncertainty about the scour depth estimate, but did not contribute enough 
uncertainty to cause the probability of limit state exceedance to change. At higher 
water velocities, all other variables (including initial erosion rate) added much less 
variation to the pier scour estimate than the error estimator. One explanation for 
this may be due to the fact that the original scour model is based on coefficients and 
a small change in the input variables does not change the coefficient used due to the 
categorical nature of the analysis. Also, while the duration (time) and initial erosion 
rate are not tempered by the coefficients, they are not directly proportional to the 
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scour depth. However, the error estimator affects the scour depth directly and has 
the widest range, due to its lognormal distribution. 
From Figures 5.6 and 5.7 above, the error estimator accounted for the most 
variability in both bridges, although the magnitude of variation in scour depth (both 
absolute and with respect to the median value estimate) is larger for the bridge in 
sandy soil due to the uncertainty in the input parameters. This helps explain the 
fundamental difference in the fragility functions presented in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 
which reveal a signature of larger uncertainty modeled by the fragility of Bridge 10 
than of Bridge 122. Furthermore, these results indicate that reducing uncertainty in 
the bias removal error estimator can improve future fragility models of bridge pier 
scour and improve accuracy in subsequent risk assessments. 
5.3. Probabilistic Abutment Scour Modeling 
While pier scour is the most common outside of extreme coastal events and leads to 
the failure of many bridges every year, it is not a major contributor to failure during 
hurricane events based on studies of damages from previous hurricanes (Froehlich 
and Fisher, 2000). During hurricanes, it has been seen that abutment scour is a more 
common occurrence and leads to more drastic failures than pier scour alone 
(DesRoches, 2006). However, as noted in the literature review, there is very little 
consensus on how abutment scour is to be modeled (Chiew, 2008). Thus, to be 
consistent across the scour analysis and as it holds the most feasibility for a regional 
study, the simplified SRICOS method is also applied to abutment scour. Abutment 
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scour occurs when the soil at the toe of the bridge abutment erodes, which can lead 
to the collapse of the abutment and the bridge structure. Figure 5.8 below shows 
how the flows around the abutment can lead to scour hole formation. 
Figure 5.8: Schematic of Abutment Scour Vortexes (Ayres, 2004). 
Since the SRICOS method is used for abutment as well as pier scour, many of 
the equations and inputs are similar; thus, the uncertainties for the shared inputs 
will remain the same as previously reported in Sections 5.2.1. The maximum 
abutment scour depth is estimated via an empirically driven equation in the SRI COS 
method presented by Briaud and Oh (2010) as: 
Equation 5.9: Maximum Abutment Scour Equation from Briaud and Oh (2010). 
where Ys is the maximum scour depth, Ytz is the floodplain water depth (which for 
this study is the same as approach water depth, y1), K1 is the correction factor for the 
shape of the abutment, K2 is the correction factor for the angle the abutment makes 
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with the flow of water, KL is the factor that corrects for the setback of the abutment 
from the water, KG is the correction factor for the channel type, Kp is the correction 
factor for the pressure flow, Re12is the Reynold's number of the water flow, and 
Fr12and Frrc are the Froude numbers for the flow based on approach water velocity 
and critical water velocity respectively. The equations for all of the factors, the 
Reynolds number and the Froude numbers are as follows. The abutment shape 
factor is given as: 
{ 
1.22, 





Equation 5.10: Correction Factor for Abutment Shape (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
where VW is a vertical wall abutment type, WW is a wing wall abutment, and ST is a 
sloping spill through. The term vertical wall for abutments is self-explanatory; the 
abutment consists of a vertical wall that meets the water. A wing wall abutment is 
usually accompanied by a vertical wall at the bridge-water interface but has a 
"wing" of material (usually concrete) attached to it, either parallel, perpendicular or 
at an angle to the wall. A sloping spill through is somewhat the opposite of a wing 
wall; the spill through has concrete sloping from the approach embankment to the 








Figure 5.9: Examples of Abutment Types (a.) Sloping Spill Through; (b.) Vertical 
Wall; (c.) Wing Wall with Angled Wings; and (d.) Wing Wall with Perpendicular 
Wings (Nielson, 2005). 
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The abutment angle factor, K2 , takes into account the angle that the abutment 
makes with the flow of water, which can increase or decrease erosion rates. For this 
study, where the data was not available for the abutment angle, the attack angle of 
the piers was used. The corrections for K2 are given as: 
Kz = {1- .0005 * 18 - 90°1, 
0.85, 
for 60°:::; 8 :::; 120 
otherwise 
Equation 5.11: Correction Factor for Abutment Angle, K2 (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
where e here is the abutment angle. K1 is defined as: 
{ (Lr- L) KL = -0.37 * Yt J 
1.0, 
(L - L) for fYt < 1.5 
otherwise 
Equation 5.12: Correction Factor for Abutment Setback from Water (Briaud and Oh, 
2010). 
where LrL is the relative setback of the abutment from the water; Lr is the length 
Y1 
from the water's edge to the end of the abutment, and L is the length of the 
abutment. For this study, when the setback amount is not known, a generic setback 
is given based on as-built estimations. KG, the correction factor for the channel type 
is defined as: 
KG= { 1.0, 
0.42, 
for compound channel 
for rectangular channel 
Equation 5.13: Correction Factor for Channel Type (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
Most of the channels are compound, natural channels; however there are 
some concrete-lined rectangular channels which greatly reduce the susceptibility to 




( d1) 2 dl 1.83 * h - 3.76 * h + 2.97, 
1.0, 
d1 for h < .33 
d1 for .33:::; h:::; 1.0 
d1 for h > 1.0 
Equation 5.14: Correction Factor for Flow Pressure (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
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where d1 is the distance between the water surface and the low chord of the bridge 
and h is the distance from the bridge deck to the toe of the abutment. The Reynolds 
number for the stream or channel is based on the density, velocity, viscosity and 
depth of the water. The equation is given below: 
Equation 5.15: Reynold's Number Equation for Channel (Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
where p is the density of water, V12 is the velocity of the water, and JJ. is the viscosity 
of the water. The last parameters of equation 5.9 are the Froude numbers which are 
defined as follows: 
Vc 
Frfc = r==== 
.J 9 * Y1 
Equation 5.16: Froude Numbers for Assumed Velocity, V11 and Critical Velocity, Vc 
(Briaud and Oh, 2010). 
where V1c is the critical water velocity defined above in the simplified SRICOS 
method, y1 is the approach water depth, and g is the gravitational constant (9.81 
mfs). From Equations 5.9-5.16, the final scour depth at abutments can be 
determined with the hyperbolic function (Equation 5.7) presented in Section 5.2. 
The duration of the storm and the initial erosion rate of the soil are both determined 
in the same way as in the pier scour analysis. With the equations all defined, the 
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uncertainties for the input parameters must be taken into account once more, as 
with the pier scour. 
5.3.1. Uncertainties in the Input Parameters 
While most of the input uncertainties remain the same as presented in the 
probabilistic pier scour (i.e. random variables for all of the hydraulic parameters for 
water depth and velocities as these remain consistent throughout the scour analysis, 
see Table 5.1), some additional parameters have to be taken into account for 
abutment scour. For example, since the abutment scour model requires the 
calculation of the Reynolds number at the abutment (the pier scour model does not), 
the uncertainty in the density and viscosity of water must be accounted for. For this 
project, the distribution for the density of water p is taken as uniform and varying 
between 1000 kgfm3 and 1025 kgfm3 to account for the uncertainty in the saline 
content of the water as sea water from the surge mixed with the fresh water. 
Currently, the density of fresh or sea water can be taken as a constant; however, 
there have been no studies on the distribution of saline content as the two types of 
water mix as they do during hurricanes. Also, while the viscosity of water at a 
certain temperature is constant, this study adopts a +I -5% uniform distribution 
around the viscosity of water at 80° Fahrenheit to account for changes in the 
temperature of the water (Kestin et al., 1978). Additionally, the abutment setback, 
(Lr- L) and the height above water, d11 are both given a uniform distribution with 
10% and 5% uncertainty respectively, based on engineering judgment and 
comparison of plans to field data. All of the additional parameters for abutment 
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scour (not previously defined for pier scour) and their probability distributions are 
given in Table 5.4 below. 
Water and Soil Parameters 
water an 
Distance between h Uniform 0.95* h 1.05* h m 
abutment and brid 
Abutment Setback Uniform 0.9* - L) 1.1 * (L - L) m 
Table 5.4: Variables and Distributions with Uncertainties Accounted for in 
Probabilistic Abutment Scour Model. 
As none of the abutment scour models have been fully validated with field 
evidence, neither has the SRICOS method for abutment scour been analyzed for the 
inherent bias in the method. Because of this, the inherent bias is not removed for 
this study and the abutment scour depth obtained from this method is considered 
conservative. This limitation provides a key area of future research need, requiring 
field data and statistical analysis of bias and model error. 
5.3.2. Capacity Limit States for Abutment Fragility Analysis 
As with pier scour, capacity limit states must be determined in order to predict the 
probability of failure or repair of the abutments. The Connecticut Department of 
Transportation (ConnDOT), in giving guidance to acceptable scour depths, says that 
the scour depth for an abutment on a spread footing should not exceed the 
embedment depth of the footing and for abutments on pile foundations, the piles 
must still be stable without any express guidance as to an appropriate scour depth 
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(DOT, 2000). Since all of the bridges in this study area are considered to have pile 
foundations, the piles dominate the scour depth considerations here as they did for 
pier scour. However, for most of the bridges, the pile depth under the abutments is 
unknown and thus a set, prescriptive limit state must be assumed. Also, because 
damage from abutment scour can occur more easily at lower scour depths than 
damage from pier scour, the limit state should be less than that for pier scour. 
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To that end, the limit states are set at 1.4 ft of scour for repair and 2.75 ft for 
complete failure, corresponding to half the assumed values for piers and in 
conjunction with reasonable estimates of when TxDOT would take actions against 
scour (Delphia, 2011). This consists only of scour at the toe of the abutment and not 
the scour of the embankment which can cause failure with even smaller scour 
depths. With these limit states, the probability of exceeding these limit states, 
leading to the repair or failure of the bridge abutments for a given hurricane event 
or a range of water velocities can be established. As with pier scour, these abutment 
limit states are prescriptive limits upon which bridge owners anticipate repair 
actions or closure of the bridge. 
5.3.3. Fragility Analysis of Abutments in the Houston/Galveston Bay Area 
Fragility curves for abutment scour were also calculated for all of the bridges in the 
abutment subset of the Houston/Galveston bay area. The same strategy for 
probabilistic analysis, sampling and regression analysis is conducted for the 
abutment fragility analysis as described for the pier scour fragility in Section 5.2.3. 
From these curves, it seems that the failure probability (limit state exceedance) is 
reached quickly over water velocities of 0.75-1 mjs depending on the bridge. The 
abutment fragility curves show much less uncertainty about the median values 
when compared to pier scour, possibly due to lower limit states, and to the lack of 
bias removal and error estimator used in pier scour. It is noted that this model error 
was a primary source of uncertainty in the pier scour analysis, but estimates of 
model error for abutment scour are lacking to date. 
Two fragility curves for abutment scour are given in Figure 5.10 and 5.11 
below for the same bridges as considered in the pier fragility analysis in Section 
5.2.3. The abutment regressions were fitted in the same way as the piers, with the 
exponential regression used for most, and all of the regressions have an R2 over 
0.98. The prarameters for these regressions can be found in Appendix D. 
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Figure 5.10: Fragility Curve Fitting for a Bridge Abutment in Sandy Soil. 
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Figure 5.11: Fragility Curve Fitting for a Bridge Abutment in Clay Soil. 
As with the pier scour fragility curves, the failure probability is negligible 
until about .3 mjs for Bridge 6 (Bridge 10 for pier), and about .95 mjs for Bridge 
107 (Bridge 122 for pier). Unlike the pier fragility curves, the abutment fragility 
curves exhibited the same regression form regardless of soil type. The median value 
and 5th and 95 th percentile values are 0.36 mjs, 0.32 mjs, 0.50 mjs for Bridge 6 and 
1.05 mjs, 0.97 mjs, and 1.3 mjs for Bridge 107. These three values indicate both 
that the bridge in sandy soil is more vulnerable to abutment scour than the bridge in 
clay soil, as anticipated, and that there is less uncertainty about the abutment scour 
estimates when compared to pier scour, as noted above. 
5.4. Qualitative Approach to Embankment Scour 
Embankment scour is somewhat difficult to define as various authorities have used 
it to mean different things over the years. In the scope of this work, however, 
embankment scour will mean any scour that occurs behind the abutment (i.e. 
beneath a sloping spill through or behind a vertical wall) or under the roadways to 
undermine the approach span support. Several examples are given in Figure 5.12 




Figure 5.12: Examples of Embankment Scour (a.) and (b.) behind Abutments and 
under Approach Spans; and (c.) under Roadways (DesRoches, 2006). 
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With this definition, embankment scour encompasses the widest range of 
scour possibilities and also has been the most documented form of scour seen in 
hurricane events (DesRoches, 2006). Despite being the most documented form of 
scour in Hurricane Katrina, no previous models determine risk from embankment 
scour let alone a scour depth for a given storm. With this in mind, this research 
develops new risk levels for bridges based on the water velocity of a given storm 
and the soil composition at the embankment Rather than conduct a fully 
quantitative probabilistic analysis of embankment scour, this study adopts a 
simplified qualitative approach to provide indicators of risk due to embankment 
scour. Future work can address this open area of study and produce quantitative 
models for abutment scour. 
5.4.1. Qualitative Risk Levels for Embankment Scour Assessment 
Four risk levels were determined based on informal solicitation of experienced 
geotechnical engineers, principles of soil mechanics and empirical evidence from 
past hurricanes (Briaud, 2011, Briaud et al., 2001). First, a bridge can have a "very 
low" risk level for embankment scour if the bridge is not inundated and the average 
storm water velocity is less than the critical water velocity. The reasoning for this 
comes from past experience that if the storm surge does not reach the roadway 
level, then embankment scour is unlikely to occur (Briaud, 2011). Inundation here is 
determined by taking the elevation of the roadway and comparing it to the surge 
height. If the bridge is not inundated and Va < \{;, it is given a risk level of "0." 
The rest of the bridges that are inundated fall into three additional 
categories: low, medium, and high risk. These risk levels are determined based on 
the critical water velocity of the soil the bridge is on and the velocity of the storm 
surge. A risk level of "1" is given when the bridge is inundated but the maximum 
water velocity is less than the critical velocity, or when the bridge is not inundated 
but the average velocity is greater than the critical velocity (meaning that erosion 
could initiate). A risk level of "2" is assumed if the bridge is inundated, the maximum 
water velocity is greater than the critical velocity, but the average velocity is less 
than the critical velocity. Finally, a risk level of "3" is given if the bridge is inundated 
and the average velocity is greater than the critical velocity. This is shown in the 
following equations: 
. {not inundated Rtsk Level O(very low) = V, < V, 
a c 
R . k L l 1(l ) _ {not inundated {inundated ts eve ow - V, > V, or V. < V, 
a c max c 
{inundated Risk Level 2(medium) = Vmax > Yc 
Va < Yc 
R . k L l 3(h" h) _{inundated ts eve tg - V, > V, 
a c 
Equation 5.17: Embankment Scour Risk Levels. 
The same uncertainties in the inputs used in pier and abutment scour are 
used in embankment scour for the critical water velocity and the storm water 
velocity. Because of this, a bridge could be given different risk levels based on the 
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varying inputs. To account for this and provide a cogent risk assessment for 
embankment scour, average, or expected value, risk level most of the simulations 
belong to will be the risk level assigned to the bridge. 
With all of the models now described, the next step in this research is 
to apply those models to the Houston/Galveston bay area and assess the risk from 
various hurricane events, as will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Case Study of the Houston/Galveston 
Bay Area Bridge System 
Once all the fragility models described in the previous two chapters were developed, 
a case study of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area was conducted. This assessment 
was conducted for various hurricane scenario events ranging in intensity and 
landing position. This chapter presents the case study scenarios and applications of 
surge and scour fragility models for risk assessment of the bridge infrastructure. 
6.1. Case Study Methodology 
6.1.1. Definition of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area 
The Houston/Galveston Bay Area was first defined in Chapter 2 as the entirety of 
Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula as well as everything within a one-mile 
radius of the Houston Ship Channel and the various bays. Thus, all the bridges 
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analyzed in the case study (155 bridges) are in the Houston/Galveston bay area and 
were considered to be in the potential region affected by coastal surge. Figure 6.1 
presents the overall Houston/Galveston bay area and shows the spatial distribution 
for the height above water of each bridge. 
Figure 6.1: Map of the Houston/Galveston Bay Area with Bridges Characterized by 
Height above Water 
6.1.2. Definitions of Scenario Events 
In order to understand the vulnerability of the Houston/Galveston bridge network 
to a variety of possible hurricane events, three scenarios were chosen as potential 
events along the Texas coastline from a suite of events analyzed by the 
Computational Hydraulics Group at UT -Austin as part of the SSPEED Center project 
to understand the lessons of Hurricane Ike and help prepare the Houston/Galveston 
area better prepare for future hurricane events (CHG 2010; Bedient, Blackburn, and 
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Sebastian 2011). The first event, Hurricane Ike, is simply a hind cast model of 
Hurricane Ike that landed in September 2008. This scenario is used as a baseline 
reference for the damage seen and as a validation or sanity-check of the values 
obtained in the fragility models. The remaining two scenarios consider a hurricane 
with 30% stronger wind speeds hitting the Houston coastline. One, called ((Ike + 
30o/o" has the same trajectory and landing position as the original Ike, but with the 
30o/o stronger winds. The other scenario, called ((Super Ike", has the 30o/o stronger 
wind speeds and a more southern landing position that would impact both Houston 
and Galveston more directly. Super Ike was the strongest of the scenarios run by the 
CHG and is considered a worst-case scenario for the Houston area. Figure 6.2 shows 
the two landing positions considered in this study for the various scenarios. 
Figure 6.2: Map of Houston/Galveston Bay Area Denoting Hurricane Scenario 
Landing Points 
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6.2. Results of Case Study Analysis 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the bridge network immediately after a 
storm event, several vulnerability models were used to determine the risk to the 
study bridges. In the sections following, short term damage or inaccessibility is 
modeled using inundation maps. Such inundation maps represent the current state 
of the art in risk mapping, although some studies just limit the identification of "high 
risk" bridges to those in the surge zone without considering deck elevation. This 
case study extends the analysis to more holistic risk analysis considering 
uncertainty in long-term damage such as structural damage and erosion, which is 
studies through the bridge deck uplift and scour models presented in Chapters 4 
and 5. After considering each failure mode individually, pier and abutment scour are 
combined together to form local scour risk, and both the local scour and uplift are 
combined in an overall risk map which presents the highest likelihood of damage 
and the failure mode that would cause it. 
Overall risk maps are presented for each of the three scenario events, while 
the individual vulnerability maps are only presented for the "Super Ike" scenario 
here; the full list of vulnerability maps are available in Appendix E. 
6.2.1. Bridge Inundation Results 
Currently for hurricane risk assessment, inundation maps are used to determine 
which bridges are vulnerable. However, inundation, which refers to whether or not 
a bridge is likely to be submerged in water at any time during the hurricane, does 
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not yield an understanding of the structural damage a bridge will face; instead, it 
gives an idea of the impassibility of a bridge immediately following the storm. 
Additionally, these inundation maps rarely use the actual elevation of the bridge and 
instead just look at the surge levels; if a bridge is in the surge zone, it is considered 
at a high risk. 
Despite the seeming drawbacks of current inundation maps, accurate 
inundation maps, which compare the elevation of the bridge deck with the likely 
surge at that point, can yield great insight into the state of the bridge system after a 
hurricane in terms of easy accessibility. As such, it is the first step in the case study 
of the Houston/Galveston bay area, both to compare with older surge zone based 
inundation maps and to compare with the bridge deck uplift model which shows 
long-term structural damage. 
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Inundation maps were developed for each of the three hurricane scenarios 
based on the data obtained from the CHG at UT-Austin, as well as LiDAR elevation 
data and bi-annual inspections. From this, it was seen that not all the bridges in the 
surge zone are at risk of inundation due to the high clearance of some bridges. 
However, in the "Super Ike" event, over half the bridges were considered inundated 
at some point during the simulation and thus, there could be issues using some of 
those bridges as re-entry routes. 
While inundation is a good first pass of risk assessment, it does not give 
enough information as to whether or not a bridge will fail merely because it was 
submerged. 
Figure 6.3 below shows the distribution of the inundated bridges during the 
((Super Ike" scenario. From Figure 6.3, it is evident that during the ((Super Ike" 
scenario all the bridges on Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula would be 
inundated at some point. Additionally, Table 6.1 shows that 46 out of the 107 
bridges with surge were inundated in the Ike scenario, while 76 out of 115 were in 
the ((Ike + 30" scenario and 93 out of 126 were in the ((Super Ike" scenario. These 
results show that being in the surge zone does not imply inundation for a bridge 
deck. In order to have a better understanding of the short-term impassability of a 
bridge, inundation maps must take into account the elevation of the bridge deck. 
However, even with the elevation of the bridge decks taken into account, inundation 
maps do not provide a measure of the vulnerability of a bridge to long-term 
structural damage. 
Table 6.1: Number of Bridge Inundated, Not Inundated and in the Surge Zone for 
Each of the Three Scenario Events 
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Figure 6.3: Map of Inundated Bridges in the uSuper Ike" Scenario. 
6.2.2. Bridge Deck Uplift Results 
The bridge deck uplift fragility surfaces described in Chapter 4 are applied to the 
case study bridges to determine a quantitative assessment of the risks of structural 
damage for three scenarios. This model compares the actual capacity of the bridge 
to resist vertical surge and wave forces with the maximum surge and wave forces 
experienced during a scenario event. The results of the uplift model were first 
compared with the Ike scenario as a sanity check to determine if the results were 
valid and the model working. While a full validation cannot be conducted with such 
a limited data set, the Ike scenario shows great consistency with the actual damages 
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seen during Hurricane Ike in 2008 and lends greater confidence to the results of the 
other two scenarios. 
Table 6.2 below gives the number of bridges in each range of failure 
probability for each scenario. As mentioned earlier, only 136 bridges were used in 
this specific vulnerability model. The risk ranges are as follows: very low (0-So/o 
Failure Probability), low (S-2So/o Failure Probability), medium (25-7So/o Failure 
Probability) and high (75-100°/o Failure Probability). 
Failure Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 127 5 1 3 
Ike with 30°/o Stronger Wind Speeds 106 4 7 19 
((Super Ike" 69 7 8 52 
Table 6.2: Number of Bridges in Each Failure Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Bridge Deck Uplift. 
From Table 6.2, it is evident that the Houston/Galveston bay area bridge 
network can withstand a hurricane of Ike's magnitude without much damage, but 
with a stronger and more direct storm, over one third of the bridges have a high 
likelihood of failure. Bridges that had a high probability of failure in these scenarios 
tend to have low clearance over mean sea level (see Table 6.3) and little or no 
connectivity between the substructure and superstructure of the bridge. This was 
also seen in the empirical evidence from Hurricane Katrina (Padgett, Spiller, and 
Arnold 2009). Figure 6.4 shows the spatial distribution of damage from the Super 
Ike scenario; seen in the figure, all the bridges on Bolivar Peninsula and about half 
on Galveston Island have a high failure probability. Additionally, several bridges in 
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the Clear Lake region and across the Houston Ship Channel exhibit a high failure 
probability. 
Figure 6.4: Map of Bridge Deck Uplift Failure Probabilities in the uSuper Ike" 
Scenario. 
5-25 2 4 1 0 
25-75 1 4 3 0 
75-100 24 17 10 1 
Table 6.3: Number of Bridges in Each Failure Probability by Height above Water in 
the uSuper Ike" Scenario. 
As an illustration of the distribution of bridges in the a Super Ike" scenario in 
particular, Table6.3 above gives the number of bridges that have a particular failure 
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probability range and height above water. This height above water is the difference 
between the water level and the low chord of the lowest elevation span because the 
bridge failure probability is predominated by the highest vulnerability span. Evident 
in the table is the conclusions above in that most of the bridges in the "high" failure 
probability range are less than 10 ft above mean water level, while more than half 
the bridges in the "very low" failure probability range are greater than 10 ft above 
mean sea level. The surge for the Super Ike scenario ranges from 11ft to 27ft at the 
bridge locations. 
6.2.3. Comparison of Bridge Deck Uplift and Inundation Results for 
Structural Damage 
To compare the current state of the art in transportation risk assessment with the 
new probabilistic methods for bridge deck uplift; a simple comparison of the 
inundation maps to the failure probability map of unseating is conducted. From a 
direct comparison of the number of bridges inundated verses "high" failure 
probability, it appears that the inundation maps overestimate the true damage state 
of the system after a hurricane. In the Super Ike scenario, for example, 93 bridges 
were considered inundated and only 62 bridges had a high failure probability. 
However, a closer look at each of the bridges, shown in Figure 6.5 below, reveals 
that not all the bridges that have a high failure probability were inundated in the 
scenario and vice versa. This phenomenon should be explored further in future 
research. One explanation, however, is the fact that inundation maps do not reflect 
wave heights that may impose significant loads on bridge decks. Furthermore, it has 
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been shown in previous experimental studies that, after a certain amount of 
submergence of the bridge span, the maximum vertical uplift force actually 
decreases; thus, a bridge that is inundated could experience a smaller demand force 
than one that is not inundated (Marin and Sheppard 2009). 
o Inundated- Low Pf 
* Inundated- High Pf 
Figure 6.5: Map Comparing Bridge Deck Uplift Failure Probability and Inundation 
for the ((Super Ike" Scenario. 
6.2.4. Pier Scour Results 
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Following the method outlined in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the failure probability of 
pier scour was calculated for each of the 123 bridges in the pier scour subset for 
each scenario event. This estimates the probability distribution of scour depth at 
each pier during the 20-60 hours of hurricane surge. The scour depth is then 
compared to the limit states for pier scour (1/8 of the embedment length for repair, 
%of the embedment length for failure with 2.75 ft and 5.5 ft respectively assumed if 
no pile length is recorded) to determine risks of scour leading to repair or to failure 
and replacement. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 below show the number of bridges in each 
failure probability category for each scenario event. Again, as with the uplift model, 
there is not enough data at this time to perform a full validation of the scour model; 
however, the results for the Ike scenario follow generally with the empirical 
evidence from Ike. In Ike, while many smaller, locally or privately owned bridges 
experienced scour, there was little documented pier scour and no major bridges 
were closed due to pier scour following Ike. Even in the stronger scenario events, a 
bridge might need repairs but there are no high failure probability bridges. This 
conforms to what Froelich and Fisher (2000) saw in North Carolina after Hurricane 
Floyd, that pier scour was not the dominant failure mode. 
Failure Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 123 0 0 0 
Ike with 30°/o Stronger Wind Speeds 122 1 0 0 
uSuper Iken 122 1 0 0 
Table 6.4: Number of Bridges in Each Failure Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Pier Scour. 
Repair Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 122 0 1 0 
Ike with 30°/o Stronger Wind Speeds 122 0 1 0 
uSuper Iken 122 0 1 0 
Table 6.5: Number of Bridges in Each Repair Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Pier Scour. 
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The spatial distribution of pier scour is shown in Figure 6.6 below. Even in 
the worst case scenario, only one bridge has a non-negligible failure probability, and 
that bridge, Rollover Pass, also experienced the highest average water velocity in 
each of the three scenarios. Rollover Pass is also the bridge that experienced bridge 
deck unseating during Hurricane Ike in 2008 and had a high failure probability for 
bridge deck uplift in each of the three scenario events. 
Bay Area Bridges 
Probability of Failure 
• 0.00 - 0.05 
0 0.05 - 0.25 
Super Ike Surge 
High : 27ft 
low : 2ft 
Figure 6.6: Map of Pier Scour Failure Probabilities in the ((Super Ike" Scenario. 
6.2.5. Abutment Scour Results 
A risk assessment for abutment scour was conducted for each of the three hurricane 
scenarios using the probabilistic models presented in Chapter 5. In each of the three 
scenarios, one bridge had a ((high" failure probability (Rollover Pass, see Figure 6.7) 
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due to the higher velocities it experienced. This again follows with the evidence 
from Ike that while small, locally owned bridges failed from scour, not many large 
state-owned bridges did. Tables 6. 7 and 6.8 below give the number of bridges in 
each failure/ repair probability category for each scenario event. Figure 6.7 shows 
the locations of the bay area bridges along with their failure probabilities for the 
((Super Ike" scenario; only Rollover Pass bridge showed a high failure probability. 
Failure Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 106 0 0 1 
Ike with 30°/o Stronger Wind Speeds 106 0 0 1 
((Super Ike" 106 0 0 1 
Table 6.6: Number of Bridges in Each Failure Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Abutment Scour. 
Repair Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 106 0 0 1 
Ike with 30°/o Stronger Wind Speeds 105 1 0 1 
((Super Ike" 104 0 1 2 
Table 6.7: Number of Bridges in Each Repair Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Abutment Scour. 
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0.25 - 0.75 
• 0.75 - 1.00 
Super Ike Surge 
High : 27ft 
Low : 2ft 
Figure 6.7: Map of Abutment Scour Failure Probabilities in the ((Super Ike" Scenario. 
6.2 .6. Local Scour Risk from Pier and Abutment Scour 
To convey scour risk more coherently to emergency officials, pier and abutment 
scour are combined into one local scour category. This is done by treating the two 
scour types as a series system (implying that failure due to either location indicates 
overall failure of the system) where the failure probability of each bridge equals: 
2 
Pr = 1 - n (1 - Pr,n) 
n=l 
Equation 6.1: Upper Bound Series Estimation of Local Scour Risk. 
where P1 is the total failure probability from scour and Pr,n is the failure probability 
from pier and abutment scour. Understanding the dependent or independent nature 
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of pier and abutment scour is outside the scope of this thesis, however, the above 
equation is instituted for local scour to give an upper bound on the failure 
probability. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 give the number of bridges in each failure and repair 
probability range respectively. Since the bridges with a failure or repair probability 
are the same in pier and abutment scour, there is still only one bridge with a high 
failure probability in local scour (Rollover Pass), and two bridges with high repair 
probability (Rollover Pass and one of the Galveston Ferry Slips). These bridges also 
experienced the highest average water velocities during the ((Super Ike" scenario, 
1.15 mjs and .23 mjs respectively, and were based in sandy or silty soil, both soil 
types known to erode more quickly than clay. 
Failure Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 146 0 0 1 
Ike with 30% Stronger Wind Speeds 146 0 0 1 
((Super Ike" 146 0 0 1 
Table 6.8: Number of Bridges in Each Failure Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Local Scour. 
Repair Probability (0/o) 
Hurricane Scenario Event 
----Ike 146 0 0 1 
Ike with 30°/o Stronger Wind Speeds 145 1 0 1 
((Super Ike" 144 0 1 2 
Table 6.9: Number of Bridges in Each Repair Category for Each Hurricane Scenario 
Event from Local Scour. 
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6.2.7. Embankment Scour Results 
The embankment scour model is a qualitative risk model that assigns risk levels 
(ranging from very low /no risk to high risk) to the bridges based on the water 
velocity at the bridge and the critical water velocity of the soil type found at the site. 
As this is a qualitative measure, the exact scour depth is not derived as part 
of this study and is recommended as an area for future work. Further work in 
embankment scour can quantify the amount of scour given a water velocity as well 
as determine the allowable scour for embankments (which remains a challenge 
given the broad definition of embankment scour). 
To that end, the risk levels for the bridges in each of the scenarios are given 
in Table 6.10. In the Ike scenario, one bridge has a high risk of embankment scour, 
while most of the bridges are not expected to have significant concern regarding 
embankment scour. With increasing severity of hurricane scenario, greater numbers 
of bridges are at a medium or high risk of embankment scour (Figure 6.8). 
Embankment scour, due to its qualitative nature, will remain a separate risk map 
from the other models that give a failure probability. This simplified indicator of risk 
based on anticipated water velocity and soil properties can serve as a basis for 
targeting more refined quantitative analysis of embankment scour potential. 
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Ike with 30o/o Stronger 
WindS eds 





Table 6.10: Number of Bridges in Each Risk Level for Each Hurricane Scenario Event 
from Embankment Scour. 
0 1-low 
2- Medium 
e 3- High 
Super Ike Surge 
High : 27ft 
low : 2ft 
Figure 6.8: Map of Embankment Risk Levels for the (I Super Ike" Scenario. 
6.3. Overall Risk Maps for the Houston/Galveston Case Studies 
Because the number of maps presented here and those in Appendix E can become 
overwhelming, a single cogent risk map was created that encompasses the greatest 
risk factor to each bridge. Each map was made by determining the failure mode 
which has the highest failure probability; this is then mapped in a similar fashion to 
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the previous maps but the failure mode is denoted by differing shapes. If there are 
two failure modes that both have a high failure probability, that is denoted by a 
separate shape. These maps are not intended to show the failure probability of both 
failure modes acting simultaneously on the bridge; rather the overall risk maps are 
composite maps of the local scour and bridge deck uplift risk maps. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.9-6.11 below for each of the scenario events, 
bridge deck uplift dominates the failure modes in all the scenario events. In the Ike 
scenario, very few bridges have a high failure probability. This one map per 
scenario, along with the embankment map shows the risk from bridge deck uplift 
and three types of scour and gives guidance as to what type of risk each bridge faces. 
Figure 6.9: Map of Risk from Uplift and Local Scour in the Hurricane Ike Scenario. 
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Figure 6.10: Map of Risk from Uplift and Local Scour in the Ike +30% Scenario. 
0 0.05-0.25 
0.25 · 0.75 
• 0.75 ·1 .00 
Super Ike Surge 
High ; 27ft 
Low : 2ft 
Figure 6.11: Map of Risk from Uplift and Local Scour in the "Super Ike" Scenario. 
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6.4. Conclusions from the Case Study Results 
This chapter has presented all the results from five different views of risk during 
hurricane events, using probabilistic models for bridge failure modes and scenario 
hurricane events. Inundation was shown as a measure of short-term inaccessibility 
and compared to the indicator of long-term damage, bridge deck uplift. Three 
different types of scour were investigated and presented here, with pier and 
abutment scour being integrated into one local scour failure mode. Finally, the 
overall risk is shown for each scenario. While scour did not play as large of a role in 
these scenario events, it is clear from the fragility curves presented in Chapter 5 that 
with a larger water velocity at the bridge sites, scour could easily become the 
controlling failure mode. 
Although the bridges in the Houston/Galveston bay area reveal low risks in a 
Hurricane Ike type storm, if a hurricane had stronger wind speeds or hit Houston 
more directly, the damage, both structural and scour (depending on velocity), could 
be severe. A significant portion of the inventory, 52 bridges, exhibited a high failure 
probability in the "Super Ike" scenario, implying that over a third of the region's 
bridges have a high risk of damage during a stronger hurricane event. In the next 




Applications of the Houston/Galveston 
Bay Area Risk Assessment 
This Houston/Galveston bay area risk assessment lends itself to three major 
applications: re-entry route assessment, predictive modeling of the transportation 
system and retrofit prioritization. These applications are listed roughly in order 
from short to long-term applications. In this chapter, these three main applications 
are discussed with some ideas for future work being presented herein. 
7.1. Assessment of the Viability of Post-Event Re-Entry Routes 
The most immediate application of this risk assessment is the ability to rank routes 
into and out of areas most impacted by hurricane forces before a hurricane hits the 
Texas coast. This assessment of re-entry routes is greatly beneficial to emergency 
planners as the coordinate post-event rescue and recovery efforts. The list of routes 
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in Table 7.1 below and their possible inaccessibility are not supposed to be taken as 
an end-all for decision making but provide an additional tool for an official to 
consider when determining how to enter a community after a storm. Local officials 
have indicated the priorities and importance of accessing regional hospitals, along 
with other critical facilities, and common consideration of major highways and 
evacuation routes as re-entry routes (Clark, 2011, EMA, 2011). 
For this study, three main regions were chosen: Galveston Island, Bolivar 
Peninsula and Clear Lake/Johnson Space Center. These three regions were chosen 
because of the devastation past hurricanes have inflicted upon these areas or their 
importance to the City of Houston. As such four major routes/ highways and five 
hospitals were chosen as representative of the area: 1-45 into Galveston Island, 
SH87 on Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula, SH146 from Galveston Island to 
Clear Lake, SH Spur 330 in the Clear Lake Region, University of Texas- Medical 
Branch (UTMB), the Shriner's Hospital and Galveston Emergency Services in 
Galveston and CHRISTUS St. John's Hospital and MD Anderson in Clear Lake. These 
routes and hospitals are listed in shown in Figure 7.1 below with the Hurricane Ike 
scenario surge overlaid. 
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Figure 7.1: Map of Overall Failure Probabilities from Hurricane Ike Scenario with 
Major Routes Overlaid. 
With the important routes and locations determined, each scenario was 
inspected to determine if the route was anticipated to be clear or possibly blocked 
by bridge damage. These accessibility rankings are given for each major re-entry 
route and route to hospital (with the route taken in parenthesis) in Table 7.1. 
Regarding the considerations of accessibility in Table 7.1, since this risk assessment 
only includes bridges listed in the NBI database (consisting of all state-owned or 
operated bridges but not locally or privately owned and operated bridges), the 
designation of itlikely accessible" or likelihood of inaccessibility is based on such 
bridges. Bridges that are not required to be reported to the National Bridge 
Inventory Program are not considered in this analysis. Additionally, for the hospitals 
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only the main route to the hospital was checked since, in a storm event, if a smaller 
road has a damaged bridge there is usually more than one way to get to the hospital. 
Given the scope of the risk assessment presented herein, accessibility designations 
on re-entry routes or major routes to hospital consider bridge unseating, pier, 
abutment scour and embankment scour. It is noted that debris is not considered 
herein and is often a major barrier to roadway accessibility. 
The considered for evaluating accessibility based on bridge performance are 
also typical primary routes for debris removal. An accessibility designation is 
assigned based on the failure probability of each failure mode for the bridges along 
the route. "Likely Accessible" is assigned if all the bridges along the route had a 
failure probability of 0-0.05 and had no more than a low risk level from 
embankment scour. "Low Probability of Inaccessibility" was assumed if any of the 
bridges along the route had a failure probability of 0.05-0.25 for unseating or scour 
or had bridges with a medium risk level from embankment scour. "Medium 
Probability of Accessibility" was given if the failure probability of any of the bridges 
on a given route were between 0.25 and 0.75 or if any of the bridges had a high 
risk from embankment scour. Finally, "High Probability of Inaccessibility" was 
assigned if any of the bridges on a route had a failure probability over 0.75 and a 
high risk to embankment scour. This work on assessment of critical routes is but a 
precursor to network reliability studies where the hospitals can be modeled as 
destinations in a typical Origin- Destination matrix and alternative routes, beyond 
the designated route assessed here, can be considered. 
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Route/Hospital Ike Ike-30 Super Ike 
145 Likely Likely Accessible Likely Accessible 
Accessible 
SH146 Likely Low Probability of Medium 
Accessible Inaccessibility Probability of 
Inaccessibility 
SH87 High Probability High Probability of High Probability of 
of Inaccessibility Inaccessibility Inaccessibility 
SH Spur 330 Likely Medium Probability High Probability of 
Accessible of Inaccessibility Inaccessibility 
UTMB (145 to SH87 Likely Likely Accessible Low Probability of 
to UTMB) Accessible Inaccessibility 
Shriner's Hospital Likely Likely Accessible Low Probability of 
(same route as Accessible Inaccessibility 
UTMB) 
Galveston Likely Likely Accessible Low Probability of 
Emergency Accessible Inaccessibility 
Medical Services 
(145 to SH87 to 
25th St) 
CHRISTUS St. Likely Low Probability of Medium 
John's Hospital Accessible Inaccessibility Probability of 
(145 to Nasa Rd.l) Inaccessibility 
MD Anderson near Likely Low Probability of Medium 
Clear Lake (same Accessible Inaccessibility Probability of 
route as St. John's) Inaccessibility 
Table 7.1: Matrix of Routes Analyzed for Each Hurricane Scenario Event with Likely 
Accessibility Rating. 
From Table 7.1 above, it is clear that 1-45 is the most viable route onto 
Galveston Island. Bolivar Peninsula could be difficult to enter from the north 
because Rollover Pass has a high failure probability in every scenario and would 
also be difficult to enter from the south by ferry as many of the ferry slips also have 
a high failure probability. The Clear Lake region is accessible from the major 
highways in most of the events, however there could be damaged bridges along SH-
146 or SH Spur- 330 in a stronger event scenario. Figure 7.1 above and Figures 7.2 
and 7.3 below show each of the scenarios graphically with the hospitals denoted by 
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stars and the critical routes highlighted. The figure for each scenario event also 
includes the highest failure probability of each of the vulnerability models; a 
composite map of the failure modes without the failure modes overlaid for clarity. 
Figure 7.2: Map of Overall Failure Probabilities from Ike+ 30o/o Scenario with Major 
Routes Overlaid. 
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0.25 - 0.75 
* Hospitals 
Critial Routes 
Super Ike Surge 
High : 27ft 
low : 2ft 
Figure 7.3: Map of Overall Failure Probabilities from I(Super Ike" Scenario with 
Major Routes Overlaid. 
Additionally, while not on the major route list for post event re-entry, some 
passages across the Houston Ship Channel could be blocked in a stronger hurricane 
event, such as Ike +30 or Super Ike. This could affect recovery work on important 
industries in the Ship Channel. Table 7.1 and Figures 7.1-7.3 give two media which 
emergency managers could use to help with decision making. 
7 .2. Predictive/Real-Time Risk Assessment 
The second application of the risk assessment presented in this thesis is real-time 
predictive modeling of bridge failure as a storm approach the Texas coast. All the 
models discussed in previous chapters are fully automated so as to allow for 
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predictive modeling of the possible bridge failures in the Houston/Galveston bay 
area. The algorithms have been developed in MATLAB (Mathworks, 2009b) and 
interface to a text bridge database file. They can enable streamlined updating of 
bridge and soil data, as well as refinement of modeling assumptions such as 
probability distributions or model error and bias estimates if new field data is 
collected and analyzed. 
The Computational Hydraulics Group (CHG) at UT -Austin can currently 
model the trajectory and strength of an impending hurricane as it moves through 
the Gulf of Mexico based on NOAA information. With the output of the CHG or other 
researchers as inputs to the bridge deck uplift and scour models, the current risk 
assessment can be conducted for any scenario event. The input needs from storm 
simulation include surge elevation, wave height and period, water velocity and 
storm duration at each bridge site. Additionally, the fragility curves for bridge deck 
unseating, pier and abutment scour can estimate the failure probability given input 
storm parameters. The advantage of developing fragility models for each bridge in 
the inventory and failure mode as conducted in this study (pier scour, abutment 
scour and unseating) is readily apparent in real time modeling. This negates the 
requirement to conduct any additional simulations or probabilistic analyses in 
support of the real or rapid risk assessment. Instead the failure probabilities can be 
directly computed from the fragility models given the hazard input. 
This provides invaluable information for emergency managers when 
planning re-entry routes because they can have access to real-time, predictive maps 
of the distribution of damage and not rely solely on pre-set scenario events. Thus, 
this application ties into the assessment of re-entry routes but gives better, more 
detailed information for the specific storm, as well as a safety assessment to begin 
prioritizing likely bridges in need of post-event inspection. Such an analysis can 
highlight structure with high damage potential for deployment of inspection crews. 
This approach has been adopted by the California Department of Transportation via 
a tool Shake Cast, used to notify inspectors of priority bridges in near real time 
following earthquake events on the basis of projected hazard intensities and bridge 
fragility estimates (Turner and Padgett, 2011). 
7.3. Retrofit Prioritization and Aids to Mitigation Efforts 
Last, the tools developed to support this risk assessment can aid in prioritizing 
bridges in need of retrofit or rebuilding efforts. There are several retrofit measures 
currently used in earthquake prone areas which may have applicability in 
increasing a bridge's capacity to withstand hurricane surge and wave forces, and 
several studies have proposed potential retrofit measures for coastal bridges 
susceptible to surge and wave loading (Padgett et al., 2008, Sawyer, 2008). That 
being said, the nature or extent of the retrofitting measures for bridges against 
hurricane forces is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, once a suite retrofit or 
mitigation measures have been determined, the risk assessment presented here can 
provide valuable information as to which bridges would benefit the most mitigation 
actions. 
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For a holistic risk based prioritization of bridges for retrofit, analysis beyond 
the three scenarios is required. Probabilistic storm surge and wave information are 
ideally integrated to reveal the risk of damage to bridges considering uncertainty in 
bridge vulnerability (quantified herein) couple with uncertainty in hazard potential. 
Furthermore, recent research has also proposed prioritization approached in which 
network topology and network reliability are considered in addition to bridge 
vulnerability (Rokneddin et al., 2011). Such approaches can provide an advanced 
basis for prioritizing bridges for retrofit in coastal regional, particularly if 
preferences beyond bridge damage, such as transportation network performance or 
accessibility of major destinations and critical facilities, are of primary interest. 
7 .4. Application Conclusions 
This chapter presents three main potential applications for the Houston/ Galveston 
bay area. One application, assessment of re-entry routes, has been explored to some 
extent, but the possibilities are endless for testing various routes on the scenario 
maps. This work is prime for network reliability studies. Additionally, two future 
applications of the risk assessment are provided, real-time modeling and retrofit 
prioritization. These two applications can be utilized as new hurricanes threaten the 
Texas coast or as mitigation measures are chosen. The next chapter presents the 
overall conclusions of this work along with ideas for future research. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Opportunities for 
Future Work 
8.1. Summary and Conclusions 
As shown through many hurricanes, from the 1900 storm in Galveston to Hurricane 
Irene in 2011, coastal regions are extremely vulnerable to damage from hurricane 
forces. This is also true of coastal transportation systems, which experienced high 
levels of damage in Hurricanes Katrina, Ike and Irene, to name a few. In order for 
emergency managers and infrastructure owners to be better prepared for possible 
damage and plan mitigation activities, this thesis implements the first Houston/ 
Galveston bay area hurricane risk assessment to bridges under multiple failure 
modes: bridge deck uplift and bridge scour. 
This thesis lays the groundwork for regional risk assessments of bridge and 
roadway infrastructure in any coastal area through the detailed information of the . 
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database compiling and methodology for the probabilistic uplift and scour models. 
The precise information necessary for the risk assessment models was presented in 
Chapter 3. Methodologies for determining bridge deck uplift and scour were 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, including a new approach to scour fragility modeling 
of bridges and the adaptation of unseating fragility analysis for the regional 
portfolio. Additionally, three case study scenario event hurricanes were tested on 
the study bridges using the methodologies in Chapters 4 and 5 to determine the 
failure probability of each bridge from each failure mode. The results of this case 
study are presented in Chapter 6, revealing the distribution of damage to bridges in 
the Houston/Galveston area associated with each event. Last, several applications 
building upon this Houston/Galveston bay area risk assessment were introduced in 
Chapter 7, including re-entry route assessment, real-time predictive modeling and 
retrofit prioritization. 
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The work presented in this study is unique in that no probabilistic 
assessment of bridges under multiple hurricane induced failure modes has been 
conducted as of yet. Granted, in the scenario events considered, unseating tended to 
control the failure mode of the bridges. Since the embankment scour model is still 
qualitative, the risk from embankment scour cannot be compared directly to the risk 
from uplift or pier /abutment scour; however, the results reveal a potential threat of 
this failure mode in several key areas. 
Some key conclusions from this research and observations from the case 
study analysis include: 
1.) In the Houston/Galveston bay area bridge infrastructure 68% of the bridges 
are less than 15 ft above the mean water level and 68% of the bridges are 
multi-span simply supported bridge types which have revealed vulnerability 
in past hurricane events 
2.) Bridge specific unseating fragility analysis under storm surge and wave 
loading is data intensive, yet most of the information required to support the 
analysis can be found in publicly available databases coupled with in-house 
inspection reports and as-built plans. Resulting unseating fragilities are 
influenced by bridge type (simply-supported vs. continuous, girder vs. slab or 
box beam), material type (steel vs. concrete) and connectivity between the 
deck and substructure of the bridge. 
3.) Probabilistic analysis of hurricane induced bridge scour can enable fragility 
models of bridges with probability of failure conditioned upon storm water 
velocity. The dominant sources of uncertainty in these probabilistic models 
are model error from the SRICOS predictive models, as well as uncertainty in 
the initial erosion rate of the soil due to assumptions made on the basis of 
soil type at bridge sites. 
4.) Bridge deck uplift was the predominant failure mode in most of the bridges 
for the scenario events considered in the case study. While the 
Houston/Galveston bay area bridge network endured the Hurricane Ike 
scenario with little damage predicted (3 out of 155 bridges with an estimated 
failure probability over 0.75), a stronger hurricane such as the "Super Ike" 
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scenario could inflict far greater damages to the bridge network (52 out of 
155 bridges with an estimated failure probability over 0.75). 
5.) While pier and abutment scour did not affect the bridges in the scenario 
events greatly (typically only 1 bridge with appreciable probability of either 
pier or abutment scour), a stronger storm with higher water velocity could 
cause increased scour damage, especially to abutments. The scour fragility 
analyses reveal median values of water velocity leading to repair or closure 
on the order of 0.36 mfs for bridge abutments in clays and 1.05 mfs bridge 
abutments in sands. 
8.2. Suggestions for Future Work 
The field of hurricane risk assessment of transportation infrastructure is still 
relatively young and as such there is a great deal of future research that can branch 
from that presented in this thesis; a few of these suggestions are enumerated below. 
1. To allow better input to the risk models, site specific soil samples can be 
obtained and tested for each bridge. This would greatly reduce the 
uncertainty in the scour models. 
2. While model bias and model error were considered for bridge deck 
unseating and pier scour in this work, sufficient statistical analysis of 
empirical data versus model estimates has not been conducted to enable 
such considerations within the abutment fragility modeling, highlighting a 
future research opportunity. 
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3. Further research on a quantitative estimate of embankment scour is needed 
to fully understand the risk embankment scour poses to both roadways and 
bridges. 
4. The hurricane risk assessment conducted herein provide failure probability 
estimates of bridges across a region and can form a foundation for future 
system reliability analysis considering connectivity or flow reliability at the 
transportation network level. 
5. As indicated in Chapter 7, numerous opportunities arise for application of the 
models in supporting risk mitigation and planning in coastal regions, with 
associated research needs. Key intellectual challenges remain, such as 
integration of hazard models with vulnerability models for real time or rapid 
assessment. Furthermore, simplified or rigorous network-level prioritization 
of bridges for upgrade can integrate the models proposed herein. However, 
the viability of various retrofit options are yet to be fully explored, 
particularly in a risk based fashion. 
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Appendix A- Definitions of Damage States 
Table A.l: Definitions of Damage States, Adapeted from Padgett et al. (2008) 
Damage State Description 
Slight Minor cracking and spalling to the abutment, cracks in shear keys at 
abutments, minor spalling and cracks at hinges, minor spalling at 
the column (damage requires no more than cosmetic repair), minor 
cracking to the deck, or slight damage to operator house. 
Moderate Any column experiencing moderate (shear cracks) cracking and 
spalling (column structurally still sound), moderate movement of 
the abutment ( <2"), extensive cracking and spalling of shear keys, 
any connection having cracked shear keys or bent bolts, keeper bar 
failure without unseating, rocker bearing failure, moderate 
settlement of the approach, moderate scour of the abutment or 
approach, damage to guardrails, wind and/ or water damage to 
operator house resulting in switchboard or content damage. 
Extensive Any column degrading without collapse - shear failure (column 
structurally unsafe), significant residual movement at connections, 
or major settlement approach, vertical offset of the abutment, 
differential settlement at connections, shear key failure at 
abutments, extensive scour of abutments, or submerged electrical 
or mechanical equipment. 
Complete Any column collapsing or connection losing all bearing support, 
which may lead to imminent deck collapse, span unseating, tilting of 
substructure due to foundation failure. 
Appendix B- Assumptions on Missing Data 
While the subsets of bridges were determined based on restrictions to the 
applicable equations (i.e. the capacity model for uplift doesn't account for timber 
bridges, pier scour can only be determined on bridges with piers and abutment 
scour on bridges without riprap), even after determining the subsets of bridges, 
some data was missing despite the multitude of data sources. The missing data was 
usually attack angle of the water to the pier or abutment or the setback of the 
abutment from the water. When a bridge was missing a piece of data, rather than 
strike the bridge from the database, some assumptions were made about the 
missing data on order to run the vulnerability models on the bridge. 
For pier scour, if the attack angle of the water to the pier was missing, the 
attack angle was assumed to be zero, as most of the bridges are aligned such that the 
water hits the bridge piers straight on. For a few bridges, pier type and size were 
missing; in those cases, a standard size of pier, 16 by 16 inches, was assumed until it 
can be replaced with more accurate data, and the pier type was assumed to be 
round-nose as most of the piers are of that type. Finally, as noted in the pier scour 
section of the scour chapter, if the pile lengths of a given pier were unavailable, as 
set limit state was used based on a 40ft pile length. Only 7 out of the 123 bridges had 
data pieces assumed, other than attack angle and pile length. 
The data available for abutment scour was less completed than that for pier 
scour, but with some appropriate assumptions, all of the data for the 107 bridges 
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was obtained. As with pier scour, the attack angle of the abutment was the piece of 
data that was missing from the most bridges; in that case, the attack angle was 
assumed as zero in keeping with the pier scour assumptions and the data collected. 
Another piece of data missing from several bridges was the setback of the abutment 
from the water's edge. For setback, the assumed length depended on the abutment 
type: if the abutment type was vertical wall, then setback was assumed as 10ft, and 
if the abutment was a sloping spill through, the setback was assumed as 40ft. These 
numbers are based on the site visits conducted and the rest of the obtained data that 
suggested the setbacks were greater for sloping spill through bridges than for 
vertical wall ones. Similarly, if abutment type was missing (none of the bridges had 
setback, abutment length and abutment type missing), the type was assumed as 
vertical wall if the length of the abutment was less than 10ft, and as sloping spill 
through if the length was greater than 10ft. Finally, if the length of the abutment was 
missing, it was assumed to have 1 ft length as all the bridges with this were of a 
vertical wall abutment type. For abutment scour, 53 out of the 107 bridges tested 
had at least one piece of data assumed. This is keeping with abutment data being 
scarcer than the pier data. 
Appendix C- Parameters of Fragility Curve 
Fitting for Pier Scour 
Quadratic Form: Pr = a * Vl + b * V1 + c 
Power Form:P1 = a * V.f' + c 
Equation C.l: Forms of the Pier and Abutment Fragility Curves 
Table C.l: Parameters of Fragility Curve Fitting for Pier Scour 
Pier P1 = 0 a b c d Form 
Bridge until 
Number vl 2::: 
1 1 0.9902 -0.002283 -9.363 -1.974 Exponential 
2 0.3 -0.04232 0.4207 -0.1827 N/A Quadratic 
3 0.3 0.9445 0.009071 -1.515 -1.233 Exponential 
4 0.6 0.006733 0.03227 -0.03476 N/A Quadratic 
5 0.6 0.008782 0.02761 -0.02838 N/A Quadratic 
6 1.2 1.875 -0.1206 -5.606 -0.9191 Exponential 
7 0.5 1.175 -0.03671 -2.905 -1.483 Exponential 
8 1.2 0.000469 3 -0.00052 N/A Power 
9 1.2 0.000476 3.034 -0.00015 N/A Power 
10 0.7 0.1402 0.9626 -0.114 N/A Power 
11 0.5 0.08921 1.099 -0.06625 N/A Power 
12 1.2 1.53 -0.08651 -6.519 -1.145 Exponential 
13 1.3 1.334 -0.06147 -10.08 -1.47 Exponential 
14 1.3 1.454 -0.07567 -7.158 -1.184 Exponential 
15 1.4 1.218 -0.04412 -23.83 -1.99 Exponential 
16 1.4 1.213 -0.0432 -25.06 -2.025 Exponential 
17 1.4 0.000423 2.133 -0.00037 N/A Power 
18 0.5 0.07777 1.153 -0.05269 N/A Power 
19 1.3 1.179 -0.03157 -9.969 -1.317 Exponential 
20 1.3 -0.1008 0.9118 -1.11 N/A Quadratic 
155 
156 
Pier Pr = o b I d Form a I c 
Bridge until I 
Number vt ~ 
I 
21 1.3 1.952 -0.1242 -5.655 -0.8606 Exponential 
22 0.5 0.1795 0.9596 -0.1443 N/A Power 
23 2.2 -0.06783 0.8604 -1.672 N/A Quadratic 
24 1.4 -0.08534 0.8529 -1.169 N/A Quadratic 
25 1.2 1.232 -0.0453 -9.634 -1.582 Exponential 
26 1.7 0.06681 1.635 -0.214 N/A Power 
27 1.5 1.98 -0.1386 -10.93 -1.158 Exponential 
28 1.7 -0.08914 0.9489 -1.512 N/A Quadratic 
29 1.9 0.005483 2.789 -0.05278 N/A Power 
30 1.3 -0.07848 0.7751 -0.9879 N/A Quadratic 
31 1.5 0.05008 1.678 -0.144 N/A Power 
32 2.1 0.007813 2.678 -0.08928 N/A Power 
33 1.3 -0.04291 0.5486 -0.7709 N/A Quadratic 
34 1.5 -0.0507 0.6055 -0.8738 N/A Quadratic 
35 2.4 -0.06513 0.8843 -1.868 N/A Quadratic 
36 2.4 -0.05959 0.8454 -1.805 N/A Quadratic 
37 1.1 1.03 -0.007568 -1654 -6.173 Exponential 
38 1.5 -0.06609 0.7865 -1.293 N/A Quadratic 
39 2.6 0.2526 1.182 -0.8463 N/A Power 
40 1.8 -0.1102 1.122 -1.837 N/A Quadratic 
41 1.7 0.008935 2.454 -0.05509 N/A Power 
42 1.9 0.03102 -0.04394 -0.05308 N/A Quadratic 
43 2.1 0.09882 1.499 -0.3399 N/A Power 
44 1.6 2.638 -0.1878 -10.88 -0.9875 Exponential 
45 1.6 -0.1781 1.505 -2.137 N/A Quadratic 
46 2.2 0.1223 1.516 -0.4742 N/A Power 
47 1.3 1.639 -0.09513 -5.91 -0.9848 Exponential 
48 1.7 2.276 -0.1609 -12.71 -1.083 Exponential 
49 1.8 1.077 -0.01508 -94.22 -2.138 Exponential 
50 1.8 2.893 -0.1789 -9.73 -0.7735 Exponential 
51 1.8 -11.11 -0.9752 1.873 -0.1123 Exponential 
52 1.8 2.738 -0.1715 -9.744 -0.7956 Exponential 
53 2 -0.0743 0.8798 -1.588 N/A Quadratic 
54 1.5 -525.7 -13.28 1.005 N/A Power 
55 1.5 -1613 -15.79 1.004 N/A Power 
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Pier Pt = 0 
I b I d 
I 





until I I 
Number Vt ~ I I I 
56 1.7 1.247 -0 .04851 -53.27 -2.11 Exponential 
57 1.5 -5 17.4 -13. 28 1.005 N/A Power 
58 1.1 -13 -15.18 1.002 N/A Power 
59 1 -4.695 -16.23 1.002 N/A Power 
60 1 -4.735 -16.31 1.002 N/A Power 
61 1.7 1.152 -0 .03231 -218 -2.922 Exponential 
62 1.8 -0.1283 1.222 -1.917 N/A Quadratic 
63 1.5 1.364 -0.06091 -22.19 -1.439 Exponential 
64 1.3 1.155 -0.02634 -8.074 -1.177 Exponential 
65 1.4 -0.08662 0.8305 -1.068 N/A Quadratic 
66 1.2 1.124 -0.02705 -22.51 -2.294 Exponential 
67 2.2 0.06978 1.738 -0.3153 N/A Power 
68 1.7 -0.02515 0.4652 -0 .8095 N/A Quadratic 
69 1.3 1.144 -0.03029 -19.2 -2.044 Exponential 
70 1.8 -17.39 -1. 267 1.347 -0.05567 Exponential 
71 1.8 1.79 -0.1155 -15.15 -1.231 Exponential 
72 1.2 1.051 -0 .01169 -50.47 -3.016 Exponential 
73 2.1 1.413 -0.07508 -200 -2.297 Exponential 
74 1.7 2.159 -0.1454 -10.27 -0.9901 Exponential 
75 1.8 -16.96 -1.248 1.374 -0.05937 Exponential 
76 1.9 -12.93 -0.7537 4.321 -0.244 Exponential 
77 2.1 1.448 -0 .0803 -177.6 -2.234 Exponential 
78 1.9 -0.09392 0.973 -1.605 N/A Quadratic 
79 1.8 -0.03859 0 .5725 -0.9918 N/A Quadratic 
80 1.8 -0 .0548 0.6936 -1.173 N/A Quadratic 
81 1.8 -0.05853 0 .7215 -1.219 N/A Quadratic 
82 1.3 1.523 -0.07876 -5.135 -0.9269 Exponential 
83 1.5 6.606 -0 .284 -10.46 -0.5619 Exponential 
84 1.6 -0.09784 0.9835 -1.484 N/A Exponential 
85 1.4 -5.715 -0.7624 1.846 -0.1024 Exponential 
86 1.2 1.597 -0.09014 -5.163 -0.9522 Exponential 
87 1.8 1.527 -0.06999 -6.818 -0.8303 Exponential 
88 2.4 -0.08034 0.9906 -2.015 N/A Quadratic 
89 2.4 -0.07876 0.9807 -2.004 N/A Quadratic 
90 1.8 1.356 -0.0587 -19.95 -1.355 Exponential 
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Pier P1 = o 
I 
b I d a 
I 
I c Form 
I 
I 
Bridge until I 
Number Vt ~ 
I I 
91 1.9 1.746 -0.1013 -13.57 -1.062 Exponential 
92 1.4 6.35 -0.231 -8.491 -0.4199 Exponentia I 
93 1.9 2.317 -0.1502 -14.28 -0.9722 Exponential 
94 1.9 -20 -1.211 1.751 -0.1057 Exponential 
95 2.2 -0.2268 2.029 -3.52 N/A Quadratic 
96 1.4 3.219 -0.2047 -7.209 -0.7247 Exponential 
97 2.5 -0.04546 0.8281 -1.951 N/A Quadratic 
98 1.3 1.656 -0.09826 -6.242 -1.016 Exponential 
99 2 1.499 -0.08714 -87.54 -1.995 Exponential 
100 2.2 -0.1416 1.428 -2.608 N/A Quadratic 
101 1.3 1.746 -0.1065 -5.908 -0.9485 Exponential 
102 1.3 1.651 -0.09601 -5.832 -0.9726 Exponential 
103 1.5 -0.1053 0.9898 -1.364 N/A Quadratic 
104 1.2 1.232 -0.04742 -16.06 -1.945 Exponential 
105 1.1 -7.065 -10.58 1.005 N/A Power 
106 1.8 -16.38 -0.5035 11.31 -0.3188 Exponential 
107 1.3 1.081 -0.01877 -156 -3.555 Exponential 
108 1.3 1.04 -0.009701 -1425 -5.206 Exponentia I 
109 2.2 -0.1711 1.663 -3.036 N/A Quadratic 
110 2.4 -0.1525 1.592 -3.135 N/A Quadratic 
111 1 -3.233 -12.43 1.003 N/A Power 
112 1.3 3.517 -0.2038 -6.369 -0.6117 Exponential 
113 1.2 1.094 -0.0217 -109.9 -3.497 Exponential 
114 1.8 -0.02166 0.4437 -0.7689 N/A Quadratic 
115 1.3 3.498 -0.1874 -5.684 -0.5306 Exponential 
116 2.1 -56.13 -1.578 1.38 -0.06208 Exponential 
117 2 -160.9 -2.108 1.102 -0.01942 Exponential 
118 1.3 2.05 -0.1323 -5.691 -0.8372 Exponential 
119 1.9 3E-05 5.314 -0.00105 N/A Power 
120 1.5 -0.08141 0.837 -1.189 N/A Quadratic 
121 1.9 -0.07824 0.867 -1.469 N/A Quadratic 
122 1.5 1.64 -0.08516 -7.262 -0.8911 Exponential 
123 1.3 1.904 -0.124 -6.328 -0.949 Exponential 
Appendix D- Parameters of Fragility Curve 
Fitting for Abutment Scour 
Table D.l: Parameters of Fragility Curve Fitting for Abutment Scour 
Abutment P1 = 0 a b c d Form 
Bridge until 
Number Vt ~ 
1 0.86 0.9848 0.008098 -15000 -11.03 Exponential 
2 0.26 0.998 0.001321 -7873 -33.33 Exponential 
3 0.31 1.002 -0.001345 -22770 -31.25 Exponential 
4 0.37 0.9897 0.006548 -1355 -18.46 Exponential 
5 0.38 0.9887 0.007203 -1277 -18.3 Exponential 
6 0.31 0.9864 0.008844 -214.1 -17.03 Exponential 
7 0.31 0.9852 0.009669 -237.7 -17.37 Exponential 
8 1 1.083 -0.04418 -3535 -7.99 Exponential 
9 0.99 1.134 -0.06906 -1846 -7.367 Exponential 
10 1 1.089 -0.04738 -3210 -7.891 Exponential 
11 0.98 1.072 -0.03902 -3154 -8.008 Exponential 
12 0.38 0.9899 0.006405 -1172 -18.07 Exponential 
13 0.31 0.9863 0.008975 -228 -17.24 Exponential 
14 0.87 0.9961 0.001572 -12800 -10.7 Exponential 
15 0.87 0.9981 0.0004225 -12310 -10.64 Exponential 
16 0.31 -9.302E-07 -12.1 1 N/A Power 
17 1.27 1.207 -0.09966 -709.9 -5.051 Exponential 
18 1.33 4.024 -0.6307 -153.6 -3.33 Exponential 
19 0.9 1.02 -0.01202 -10210 -10.05 Exponential 
20 0.94 0.9849 0.007326 -7805 -9.434 Exponential 
21 0.96 0.9914 0.003654 -9103 -9.365 Exponential 
22 0.95 0.9804 0.009682 -8943 -9.449 Exponential 
23 0.92 0.981 0.009588 -6447 -9.399 Exponential 
24 1 1.113 -0.059 -2576 -7.652 Exponential 
25 1.33 2.662 -0.4533 -220.1 -3.726 Exponential 
26 0.92 0.9906 0.004129 -5520 -9.233 Exponential 
27 0.92 0.9872 0.006028 -6045 -9.325 Exponential 
28 1.26 1.349 -0.1523 -493.6 -4.77 Exponential 
29 1.26 1.322 -0.1412 -488 -4.765 Exponential 
159 
160 
Abutment P1 = 0 a b I c d I Form I 
Bridge until I ! I 
Number v 1 2:: I I 
30 0.91 0.986 0.006667 -5940 -9.399 Exponential 
31 0.94 1.021 -0.01247 -3977 -8.628 Exponential 
32 0.89 1.019 -0.01124 -8653 -9.975 Exponential 
33 0.9 1 -0 .0006527 -15870 -10.6 Exponential 
34 0.94 1.003 -0.002816 -5825 -9.077 Exponential 
35 0.95 1.021 -0.01296 -4600 -8.704 Exponential 
36 0.95 1.003 -0.003062 -6428 -9.086 Exponential 
37 0.95 1.01 -0.006505 -5442 -8.928 Exponential 
38 0.92 0.9983 -0.00004957 -4805 -9.042 Exponential 
39 1.21 1.109 -0.05857 -598.1 -5.183 Exponential 
40 1.21 0.9911 -0.002495 -801.4 -5.47 Exponential 
41 1.32 4.918 -0.7079 -119.5 -3.085 Exponential 
42 1.28 1.398 -0.1689 -535.9 -4.761 Exponential 
43 1.26 1.184 -0.08844 -637.4 -5.008 Exponential 
44 1.33 3.422 -0.5672 -196.4 -3.564 Exponential 
45 1.61 -0.3923 3.813 -5.196 N/A Quadratic 
46 1.32 7.449 -0.8728 -102.4 -2.825 Exponentia l 
47 1.32 3.512 -0.5717 -158.5 -3.408 Exponentia l 
48 1.33 3.662 -0 .5914 -167.9 -3.425 Exponentia l 
49 0.99 1.132 -0.06806 -1819 -7.353 Exponentia l 
50 1 1.086 -0.04623 -3335 -7.928 Exponentia l 
51 1 1.092 -0.04893 -2974 -7.815 Exponentia l 
52 0.92 1.011 -0.006836 -3656 -8.758 Exponentia l 
53 0.99 1.046 -0.02572 -5190 -8.458 Exponentia l 
54 0.9 1.013 -0.007868 -9967 -10.06 Exponentia l 
55 0.99 1.029 -0.01701 -6002 -8.63 Exponentia l 
56 0.94 0.9898 0.004576 -7459 -9.341 Exponentia l 
57 1.26 1.193 -0.09413 -732.4 -5.113 Exponentia l 
58 0.94 1.011 -0.00727 -4863 -8.851 Exponentia l 
59 1.24 1.089 -0.0487 -814.4 -5.312 Exponentia l 
60 0.99 1.054 -0.02953 -4424 -8.299 Exponentia l 
61 0.91 0.9844 0.007626 -5460 -9.352 Exponentia l 
62 1.27 1.394 -0.1663 -477 .2 -4.7 Exponential 
63 1.22 1.299 -0.1336 -396.8 -4.746 Exponential 
64 1.26 1.672 -0.2529 -313.1 -4.334 Exponential 
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Abutment P1 = 0 a b c d Form 
Bridge until 
Number Vt ~ 
65 1.26 1.279 -0.1262 -567.8 -4.891 Exponential 
66 1.3 4.127 -0.6429 -130.5 -3.252 Exponential 
67 1.25 1.029 -0.02132 -1032 -5.491 Exponential 
68 1.22 0.9501 0.01744 -1081 -5.685 Exponential 
69 1.27 1.655 -0.2483 -353.7 -4.404 Exponential 
70 0.95 0.9903 0.004255 -6646 -9.155 Exponential 
71 0.95 1.001 -0.001755 -6183 -9.033 Exponentia l 
72 0.99 1.033 -0.0189 -6235 -8.662 Exponentia l 
73 0.98 1.005 -0.004187 -8143 -9.072 Exponentia l 
74 0.94 0.9809 0.009522 -8147 -9.453 Exponentia l 
75 1.22 1.318 -0.1402 -383.8 -4.706 Exponentia l 
76 1.32 13.69 -1.079 -87.34 -2.455 Exponentia l 
77 1.32 22.19 -1.228 -89.62 -2.265 Exponentia l 
78 1.31 -6.939 -6.368 1.067 N/A Power 
79 0.99 1.032 -0.01846 -5772 -8.587 Exponentia l 
80 1.32 3.961 -0.6263 -155.3 -3.355 Exponentia I 
81 1.33 2.991 -0.5075 -209 .2 -3.662 Exponential 
82 1.32 7.269 -0.8647 -105 .8 -2.858 Exponential 
83 0.9 1.016 -0.009418 -11040 -10.14 Exponential 
84 1.33 4.037 -0.6329 -156.4 -3.342 Exponential 
85 1 1.097 -0.05115 -2803 -7.761 Exponential 
86 0.99 1.047 -0.02638 -4769 -8.376 Exponential 
87 0.94 1.02 -0.01205 -3730 -8.579 Exponential 
88 0.99 1.043 -0 .02434 -5086 -8.446 Exponential 
89 0.94 1.033 -0.01892 -3173 -8.391 Exponential 
90 0.94 1.008 -0.005776 -5101 -8.905 Exponential 
91 0.99 1.039 -0 .02231 -5488 -8.535 Exponential 
92 0.98 1.08 -0.04313 -2954 -7.934 Exponential 
93 0.95 1.081 -0.04367 -6050 -8.947 Exponential 
94 0.95 1.019 -0.01138 -4446 -8.673 Exponential 
95 0.95 1.077 -0.04167 -5973 -8.937 Exponential 
96 0 .95 1.066 -0.03622 -6876 -9.109 Exponential 
97 0.95 1.055 -0 .03026 -8075 -9.275 Exponential 
98 0.95 0.9946 0.001717 -7413 -9.261 Exponential 
99 0.94 1.013 -0.008443 -4583 -8.798 Exponential 
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Form a c I I I 
Bridge until I I 
I 
Number vt ~ I 
I I 
100 0.94 1.02 -0.01219 -4223 -8.716 Exponential 
101 0.94 1.002 -0.002187 -5457 -8.986 Exponential 
102 0.98 1.072 -0.03912 -3260 -8.051 Exponential 
103 1.32 3.569 -0.5823 -169.1 -3.453 Exponential 
104 1.32 4.767 -0.697 -126.3 -3 .138 Exponential 
105 1 1.096 -0.05072 -3081 -7.836 Exponential 
106 0.99 1.054 -0.02962 -4525 -8.316 Exponential 
107 0.95 1.017 -0.01068 -5300 -8.849 Exponential 
Appendix E- Risk Maps of 
Houston/Galveston Case Study 
Figure E.l: Map of Inundated Bridges in the Hurricane Ike Scenario 
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Figure E.2: Map of Inundated Bridges in the Ike + 30o/o Scenario. 
Figure E.3: Map of Failure Probabilities from Uplift in the Hurricane Ike Scenario. 
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Figure E.4: Map of Failure Probabilities from Uplift in the Ike +30o/o Scenario. 
Figure E.S: Comparison Map of Uplift and Inundation for Hurricane Ike Scenario. 
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Figure E.6: Comparison Map of Uplift and Inundation for Ike +30o/o Scenario. 
Figure E. 7: Map of Failure Probabilities for Pier Scour in the Hurricane Ike Scenario. 
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Low : 2ft 
Figure E.8: Map of Failure Probabilities for Pier Scour in the Ike +30°/o Scenario. 
Figure E.9: Map of Failure Probabilities for Abutment Scour in "Ike" Scenario. 
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Figure E.lO: Map of Failure Probabilities for Abutment Scour in Ike + 30% Scenario. 
Figure E.ll: Map of Failure Probabilities for Local Scour in Hurricane Ike Scenario. 
Figure E.12: Map of Failure Probabilities for Local Scour in Ike+ 30°/o Scenario. 
0.25 - 0.75 
• 0.75 - 1.00 
Super Ike Surge 
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Low ; 2ft 
Figure E.13: Map of Failure Probabilities for Local Scour in "Super Ike" Scenario. 
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Figure E.14: Map of Embankment Scour Risk Levels for Hurricane Ike Scenario. 
Figure E.15: Map of Embankment Scour Risk Levels for Ike+ 30°/o Scenario. 
